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I. INTRODUCTION
The question of what constitutes an "investment" "has turned out to be
one of the most highly contested" issues in international investment law. 1
Dozens of articles have been written on the subject.2 Dozens of cases have
litigated and decided the question. 3 Still, as one recent award observed, "the
meaning of the term is far from ... clear."4
The lack of clarity surrounding this fundamental threshold question is
problematic for at least three reasons. First, it undermines the very object and
purpose of the international investment regime. Through international
investment law, States promise important substantive and procedural protections
to foreign investors in order to encourage investment within their borders and to
obtain the same protections for their nationals abroad. 5 But the international
investment regime can neither effectively protect nor promote foreign
investment if States and economic actors do not know ex ante whether their
Boaz Moselle, Economics and the Meaning ofInvestment, in JURISDICTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION 7, 8 (Yas Banifatemi & Emmanuel Gaillard eds., 2018).
2 See infra notes 6, 7, 9, 11, 14, 17.
3 See infra notes 4, 13, 16, 48, 49.
4 Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, Decision on Jurisdiction
and Admissibility, 442 (Feb. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Ambiente Ufficio Jurisdiction] ("The intensive
debate, not to say controversy, regarding the term 'investment' which has become manifest in various
arbitral decisions dealing with Art. 25 of the ICSID Convention but also in pertinent academic circles,
reveals that the meaning of the term is far from being clear."). See also Saba Fakes v. Republic of
Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award, 97 (July 14, 2010) [hereinafter Saba Fakes Award] ("As
far as the definition of 'investment' is concerned, however, the Tribunal observes that, while a number
of ICS[D tribunals have dealt with this notion, no unanimous approach has emerged so far from the
existing case law. The proposed solutions are inconsistent, if not conflicting, and do not provide any
clear guidance to future arbitral tribunals.").
5 See NIGEL BLACKABY AND CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES (WITH ALAN REDFERN AND MARTIN HUNTER),
REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION §§ 8.58, 8.59, 8.75, 8.79 (2009).
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transactions constitute investments and are thus subject to protection in the first
place.6
Second, the uncertainty surrounding the definition of "investment"
creates significant waste. It contributes to the fact that jurisdictional disputes are
often "the focal point" of arbitrations and are "more lengthy and hard-fought
than any eventually ensuing merits phase." 7 Finally, it undermines the legitimacy
of the international investment regime, which is subject to well-deserved
criticism for producing inconsistent and arbitrary decisions. 8 The regime is
particularly vulnerable to this charge with respect to case law on the definition
of "investment," which has been described as "so incoherent as to be a free
choice for tribunals." 9
Much of the debate over the definition of "investment" has centered on
whether the term should have any independent and objective meaning at all.
Article 25 of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States ("ICSID Convention" or "Convention")
limits jurisdiction to "any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment,"
without defining the term "investment."' 0 In light of the additional jurisdictional
requirement that parties must "consent in writing" to any ICSID arbitration,
many tribunals have held, and many commentators have counseled, that it is
appropriate for tribunals to defer to States' own subjective interpretation of the
term "investment," as reflected in States' consent documents. In practice, that
6 See Zachary Douglas, Property, Investment and the Scope of Investment Protection Obligations, in
THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO PRACTICE 363,
372-373 (Zachary Douglas et al. eds., 2014).
7 See Emmanuel Gaillard, Introduction, in JURISDICTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 1, 1
(Yas Banifatemi & Emmanuel Gaillard eds., 2018).
' See generally Susan Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1568 (2005)
(inconsistent awards undermine "the legitimacy of investment arbitration, particularly where public
international law rights are at stake and the legitimate expectations of investors and Sovereigns are
mismanaged").
9 W. Michael Reisman & Anna Vinnik, What Constitutes an Investment and Who Decides?, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 50,
70 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2010). The implications of the "investment" debate extend beyond the
present international investment regime as well. The definition of "investment" bears on investor-State
reform proposals currently under consideration by UNCITRAL, including on the jurisdictional reach of
the proposed Multilateral Investment Court. See, e.g., United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law, Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of its
Thirty-Seventh Session (New York, 1-5 April 2019), U.N. Doe A/CN.9/970 (Apr. 9, 2019),
https://uncitml.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/acn9 970 as sub 1.pdf; Council of the European
Union, Negotiating Directives for a Convention Establishing a Multilateral Court for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes, 12981/17 ADD 1 DCL 1 (March 20, 2018),
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12981-2017-ADD-I-DCL-1/en/pdf. It is also relevant
to recently launched international commercial courts, including the Chinese International Commercial
Court, whose jurisdiction is defined to exclude investor-State disputes. See Pamela Bookman, The
Adjudication Business, 45 YALE J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 43), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=3338152&download=yes (discussing the new
Chinese International Commercial Court and noting that it "will not hear investor-state disputes").
10 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States
art. 25, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966) [hereinafter
ICSID Convention].
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has meant tribunals look to the definition of "investment" in the bilateral
investment treaty ("BIT") giving rise to the arbitration. That definition almost
always defines "investment" broadly as including "all assets" or "every asset."
There are serious problems with that "subjective" approach, however,
as other tribunals and commentators have pointed out. Most fundamentally, it
violates international law on treaty interpretation by effectively reading the term
"investment" out of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. If, for example, States
subjectively defined "investment" so broadly as to encompass activities that
manifestly did not qualify as such, the term in Article 25 would be rendered
null. 11
Determining that the term "investment" must have some objective
meaning, however, provides no insight into what that meaning should be. Amid
the "intensive debate" over this question, 12 one positive definition and one
negative definition have prevailed over the rest. The positive definition, known
as the Salini test, defines "investment" by certain positive attributes. The original
factors of that test include: (i) "a certain duration"; (ii) "a certain regularity of
profit and return"; (iii) "assumption of risk usually by both sides"; (iv)
"commitment [that] is substantial"; and (v) "significance for the host State's
development." 13 While recognized as the "prevailing approach in ICSID
practice," 14 the Salini test has remained highly controversial and subject to
extensive debate. 15
The negative definition of "investment," on the other hand, defines the
term by what it is not. According to this definition, "the term 'investment' does
not mean 'sale" '"16 or "ordinary commercial transaction. '17 Unlike the Salini test,
this negative definition of "investment" has been almost entirely uncontroversial
and nearly universally accepted. The most prominent commentators have
accepted as a matter of faith "that ordinary commercial transactions would not
"See Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora's Box: Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitration, 101 AM.
J. INT'L L. 711, 722-23 (2007).
12 Ambiente Ufficio Jurisdiction, supra note 4, 442.
13 CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY, art. 25, 122 (1st ed. 2001)
[hereinafter SCHREUER 1] (emphasis removed). See also Salini Costruttori, S.p.A. v. Kingdom of
Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 52 (July 23, 2001) [hereinafter Salini
Jurisdiction].
'4 Roberto Castro de Figueiredo, The Investment Requirement of the ICSID Convention and the Role of
Investment Treaties, 26 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 453, 458 (2015); id. at 457 ("[M]ost ICSID tribunals that
were required to decide on the fulfillment of the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention
followed the objectivist theory and applied the double-barreled test approach in investment treaty
disputes.").
5 See, e.g., Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, The Long March Towards a Jurisprudence Constante
on the Notion ofInvestment, in BUILDING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: THE FIRST 50 YEARS OF
ICSID 97, 97 (Meg Kinnear et al. eds., 2015) ("Rarely has an arbitral award been as celebrated or
criticized as Salini .... ").
16 Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN. BHD. v. Government of Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1 0,
Decision on the Application for Annulment, 72 (April 16, 2009) [hereinafter Malaysian Historical
Salvors Annulment].




be covered by [ICSID]' 18 and that "simple sales and purchases of goods ...
clearly do not qualify as investments."' 9 Even those, such as Judge Schwebel,
who favor giving "great weight" to the consent of the contracting parties, agree
that "a simple sale of goods and like transient transactions" 20 are beyond the
scope of ICSID's jurisdiction.21 Indeed, the notion that "investment" excludes
"ordinary commercial transactions" may be the only thing on which
commentators and tribunals agree. 22
Despite (or perhaps because of) its widespread acceptance, this negative
definition of "investment" and its application in practice have been the subject
of scant attention and almost no critical analysis. This is surprising because, as
this Article demonstrates, the definition has been at least as impactful as the far
more scrutinized and debated Salini test. It is further surprising because the
negative definition of "investment" is fundamentally flawed-historically, as a
matter of interpretation, conceptually, and in practice. As I argue in this Article,
the one thing in the "investment" debate on which commentators and tribunals
agree is at the very root of the "incoherent" jurisprudence on that term. 23
This Article makes the following contributions to the "investment"
debate:
First, this Article shows that the putative distinction between
commercial and investment transactions has been a driving force behind awards
denying jurisdiction on Article 25 "investment" grounds. I conduct a
comprehensive review of investor-State jurisdictional awards that have turned
on the definition of an Article 25 "investment." This review demonstrates that,
in attempting to give effect to the distinction between commercial and
investment activities, tribunals have effectively created a distinct jurisdictional
test, which I dub the commercial transaction test. This test ascribes certain
positive attributes to investments-based on, but distinct from, the Salini
factors-in order to distinguish them from mere commercial activities. As
measured by the number of negative jurisdictional awards it has justified, this
18id.
9 SCHREUER I, supra note 13, art. 25, 120.
20 Stephen Schwebel, Does the Consent of the Contracting Parties Govern the Requirement of an
'Investment' as Specified in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention?, in JURISDICTION IN INVESTMENT
TREATY ARBITRATION 55, 58-60 (Yas Banifatemi & Emmanuel Gaillard eds., 2018).
2 That belief has been so widely adopted that tribunals have invoked it to deny jurisdiction even when
the ICSID Convention does not apply. See infra Sections III.A.3, III.A.5, HLJ.A.6
2 2 Julian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning of Investment: ICSID's Travaux and the Domain of
International Investment Law, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 257, 298, 316 (2010) ("If commentators agree on
anything in this area, it is that pure trade transactions should not be subject to ICSID jurisdiction."); see
also Alps Finance and Trade AG v. Slovak Republic, Award, 245 (Mar. 5,2011) (ad-hoc arbitration)
[hereinafter Alps Finance Award] ("The constant jurisprudential trend has led the most prominent
doctrine to exclude in categorical terms that a mere one-off sale transaction might qualify as an
investment."); Jeremy Marc Exelbert, Consistently Inconsistent: What Is a Qualifying Investment Under
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention and Why the Debate Must End, 8 FORDHAM L. REV. 1243, 1272
(2016).
21 See Reisman & Vinnik, supra note 9, at 70.
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commercial transaction test has had an equal to or greater impact than the far
more prominent and scrutinized Salini test.
Second, I demonstrate that the commercial transaction test, including its
underlying premise that commercial and investment activities are distinct and
separable, is fundamentally flawed-historically, as a matter of interpretation,
conceptually, and in practice. As an initial matter, the historical premise that
underpins it-that "it was always clear [to the Convention's drafters] that
ordinary commercial transactions would not be covered by [ICSID]" 24 -- is
wrong. As other scholarship has demonstrated, the negotiating history does not
support but rather contradicts this premise.25
I contribute to that scholarship by demonstrating that the investment-
commerce distinction is conceptually and interpretationally misconceived as
well. There is no principled or textually supportable line to be drawn between
commercial and investment activities. They are, rather, inherently intertwined
and overlapping. For example, economic principles show that the quintessential
commercial transaction-a sale of goods-may constitute an investment, while
international commercial law shows that investments are a type of commercial
transaction. The conceptual flaws of the putative distinction between investment
and commercial activities are further evidenced by tribunals' attempts to draw
one. The factors tribunals employ in the commercial transaction test fail to
provide a principled or predictable basis for distinguishing between investment
and non-investment activities. They instead inject uncertainty into investor-State
arbitration.
Third, I examine the potential policy implications of jettisoning the
commercial transaction test. Case law and commentary suggest four possible
policy functions of the commercial transaction test. The test arguably: (i)
enhances the efficiency of the international investment regime; (ii) filters out
commercial disputes that could be adjudicated in other dispute resolution
centers; (iii) limits conflict with international commercial law; and (iv) limits
conflict with international trade law. In none of these roles, however, is the
commercial transaction test precise or effective. To the contrary, it is at best a
crude instrument for these purposes, all of which would be better pursued
through other means. The weak policy rationale for the test supports the legal
conclusion that it should be abandoned.
Abandoning the investment-commerce distinction does not require a
reversion to the "subjective" approach to defining "investment. 26 The term
"investment" in Article 25 should have a fixed boundary that excludes some
activity, but that boundary should be principled, predictable and textually
defensible. What boundary is left to draw around "investment," if sales of goods
may be included within it? The most obvious answers to that question are the
24 SCHREUER H, supra note 17, art. 25, 122.
25 See Mortenson, supra note 22.
26 Nor does this Article support the theoretically bounded (but practically unbounded) definition of
"investment" as "any plausibly economic activity or asset." See Mortenson, supra note 22, at 260.
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boundaries supplied by the positive definitions of "investment," including the
"ordinary meaning" and the Salini test definitions of the term. Economic
principles suggest consideration of another negative definition: instead of
drawing a distinction between investment and commercial transactions, tribunals
could draw a distinction between investment and consumption transactions.
This basis for this proposal as well as the other arguments summarized
above are presented, respectively, in Parts HI-V, below.
The background for this discussion is first laid out in Part II, which
provides a general overview of the ICSID Convention and the debate over the
meaning of its most controversial term.
II. "INVESTMENT" IN ARTICLE 25 OF THE ICSID CONVENTION
A. The ICSID Convention and Article 25's "Investment"
Requirement
The ICSID Convention is the centerpiece of the international investment
regime. Entered into force in 1966, the Convention established the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID" or "Centre") to
conciliate and arbitrate investment disputes between its Contracting States and
nationals of other Contracting States. 2 7 The Centre complements other fora
established for the resolution of international disputes, while the Convention
complements other international arbitration conventions, including, in particular,
the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention").28
Both the ICSID Convention and the New York Convention establish
"pro-enforcement" regimes for arbitral awards.2 9 The New York Convention,
however, allows awards to be annulled by the national courts at the seat of the
arbitration, 30 and permits certain narrow grounds for resisting enforcement,
including but not limited to jurisdictional and public policy objections. 31 The
ICSID Convention, on the other hand, precludes the annulment of awards by
national courts, limiting the power to annul to ICSID itself,32 and allows no
analogous grounds for resisting the enforcement of awards. It requires that each
27 ICSID Convention, supra note 10, pmbl.
25 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards art. 1(3), June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, 333 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
29 See GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 378 (2012) [hereinafter BORN,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE] ("The New York Convention establishes a 'pro-
enforcement' approach toward foreign awards."); id. at 377 ("the New York Convention provides for an
award's presumptive recognition, subject to only narrow, enumerated exceptions. Likewise, most
arbitration statutes, including the UNCITRAL Model Law, presumptively require the recognition of
awards, again subject only to specifically-identified exceptions ... .
3 New York Convention, supra note 28, art. V(l)(e).
3"Id. art. V.
32 See ICSID Convention, supra note 10, arts. 52-53.
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of its 153 Contracting States enforce any investor-State arbitration award issued
by the Centre "as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. 33
Neither the ICSID Convention nor New York Convention establishes
any substantive rights for foreign investors. Those rights are instead established
by national legislation, contract, and the over 2,000 bilateral investment treaties
("BITs") entered into by States. 34 Through BITs, which give rise to the majority
of ICSID arbitrations, 35 States promise certain protections and guarantees to
foreign investors of the counter-State Parties. These typically include the
guarantee of "fair and equitable treatment," "national treatment," and protection
against unlawful and uncompensated expropriation.3 6 Moreover, States consent
to arbitrate any claims that may arise from the promised protections directly with
foreign investors themselves.37 Most BITs provide investors the option to choose
between ICSID arbitration and arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration Rules of
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"). 38
Where the investor-claimant chooses UNCITRAL arbitration, the enforcement
of the resulting award is subject to the New York Convention or other similar
regional conventions. 39 Where the investor-claimant initiates ICSID arbitration,
the enforcement of the award is subject to the ICSID Convention.40
Unlike UNCITRAL arbitrations subject to the New York Convention,
ICSID's jurisdiction is limited to "legal disputes arising directly out of an
investment," which the parties have "consent[ed] in writing" to arbitrate. Article
25(1) of the Convention provides:
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute
arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting
State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting
State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of
another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute
consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties
33 Id. art. 54(1).
14 See International Investment Agreements Navigator, UN CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV.,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/intemational-investment-agreements (last visited Nov. 17, 2019).
While some investment treaties are entered into on a multilateral basis, for the sake of simplicity I will
refer to all investment treaties as BITs.
35 SCHREUER II, supra note 17, art. 25, IN 139, 378.
36 See REDFERN, HUNTER, ET AL., supra note 5, §§ 8.59, 8.79, 8.98.
37 Id.
" See Reisman & Vinnik, supra note 9, at 70.39 See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, 949 F. Supp. 2d 57 (2013) (confirming an
UNCITRAL investor-State arbitration award issued against Ecuador pursuant to the New York
Convention). Regional conventions include the Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration, Jan 30, 1975, 1438 U.N.T.S. 245, and the Riyadh Arab Agreement on Judicial
Cooperation, Apr. 6, 1983 [unofficial translation available at: Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial
Cooperation, REFWORLD, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38d8.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2019)].
See also REDFERN, HUNTER, ET AL., supra note 5, §§ 11.36-11.39 (discussing application of the various
conventions to the enforcement of arbitration awards).
40 States may consent to arbitrate investment disputes pursuant to other international arbitration
institutions or rules as well. SCHREUER I, supra note 17, art. 25, 441. Awards issued in these
proceedings would also require enforcement pursuant to the New York Convention.
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have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent
unilaterally.
4 1
)While Article 25(1) limits ICSID's jurisdiction to legal disputes "arising directly
out of an investment," neither it, nor any other part of the ICSID Convention,
defines the term "investment.,
42
B. The Negotiating History of the ICSID Convention and the Case
for a Subjective Definition of "Investment"
In early ICSID arbitrations, tribunals did not attempt to define the term
"investment" in Article 25. They instead consistently deferred to States' own
definitions of "investment" in their consent documents when determining
jurisdiction.4 3 As noted, in addition to the requirement that the dispute arise from
an "investment," Article 25(1) also requires that the foreign national and the
Contracting State "consent in writing" to arbitration. This point is emphasized in
the Preamble of the Convention, which recognizes "no Contracting State shall
by the mere fact of its ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention and
without its consent be deemed to be under any obligation to submit any particular
dispute to conciliation or arbitration. ' 4
4
In principle, State consent may take the form of an arbitration agreement
between a State and a foreign national. 4 In practice, State consent is almost
always established by BITs, 46 which, unlike the ICSID Convention, do define
the term "investment." 47 Such definitions are almost always broad and
encompass "every kind of asset" or "all assets," including claims to money and
to any performance having a financial value. 4' Thus, in the first ICSID
arbitrations, where foreign nationals brought claims for disputes that arose
directly from activities that fit within that wide definition of "investment,"
tribunals found jurisdiction under Article 25.
Deference to Contracting States' consent documents was generally
justified by way of the Convention's negotiating history. According to the
41 ICSID Convention, supra note 10, art. 25(1).
42 The Preamble to the ICSID Convention further states, in part, that the Convention was agreed by the
Parties "[c]onsidering the need for international cooperation for economic development, and the role of
private international investment therein." Id. pmbl. The Preamble thus qualifies that the ICSID
Convention concerns "private international investment," as opposed to public investment, but provides
no further definition ofo"investment" per se.
4 See Mortenson, supra note 22, at 259.
4ICSID Convention supra note 10, pmbl.
4 Consent to arbitration by the foreign investor, on the other hand, is satisfied when the investor
commences arbitration. SCHREUER II, supra note 17, art. 25, 416, 448.
46 SCHREUER II, supra note 17, art. 25, 139, 378.
47 Id. art. 25, 140.
48 Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision of the Tribunal on
Objections to Jurisdiction, 34 (July 11, 1997) [hereinafter Fedax Jurisdiction] (citing Antonio R. Parra,
The Scope of New Investment Laws and International Instruments, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE LAW 27, 35-36 (Robert Pritchard ed., 1996)).
49 See, e.g., Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award,
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Executive Directors' Report, which accompanied the final text of the ICSID
Convention submitted to the States for ratification,5 1 the decision to not define
the term "investment" was a deliberate choice made in light of the "consent in
writing" requirement of Article 25. With respect to Article 25, the Executive
Directors' Report stated:
No attempt was made to define the term 'investment' given the
essential requirement of consent by the parties, and the
mechanisms through which the Contracting States can make
known in advance, if they so desire, the class of disputes which
they would or would not consider submitting to the
Centre... 51
The decision to leave "investment" undefined was in fact the result of a
compromise reached after several failed attempts to define the term. 52
Proponents of a narrow definition of "investment" agreed not to restrict the term
by way of an incorporated definition, while proponents of a broad definition
312 (July 24, 2008) [hereinafter Biwater Award]; Camuzzi Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/2, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 58 (May 11, 2005); Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, 82 (Apr. 29, 2004); Mihaly Int'l Corp. v.
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/2, Award, 33, 49 (Mar. 15,
2002) [hereinafter Mihaly Award]; Czeskoslovenska Obchodni Banka (CSOB) v. Slovak Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 64, 66 (May 24,
1999) [hereinafter CSOB Jurisdiction].50 ICSID, REPORT OF THE ExEcuTIvE DIRECTORS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT ON THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN
STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES (1965).
" Id. at 28.
52 For example, the first draft of the ICSID Convention defined "investment" as "any contribution of
money or other asset of economic value for an indefinite period or, if the period be defined, for not less
than five years." ICSID, I HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION: DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN
AND FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION ON SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND
NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES 116; see also Pierre-Marie Dupuy, About the Definition of an
International Investment: The Requirement of a Contribution to the Economic Development of the Host




agreed to allow States to tailor the types of activities they wished to subject to
ICSID jurisdiction via the "consent in writing" requirement.53
According to partisans of the so-called subjective approach, this history
calls for deferring to the definition of "investment" reflected in the Contracting
States' BITs.54
C. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Case for
an Objective Definition of "Investment"
Proponents of the "objective" view argue that the very inclusion of the
term "investment" in Article 25 defies complete deference to the parties' consent
document. They argue that Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention of the Law
of Treaties ("Vienna Convention" or "VCLT") requires that the term
"investment" be given its "ordinary meaning" in its "context and in the light of
[the treaty's] object and purpose." 55 While the negotiating history of the ICSID
Convention may favor a deferential or subjective approach, that history is not
dispositive 5 6 According to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, recourse to
negotiating history is optional ("may be had") "as a supplementary means of
interpretation." 57 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention-and specifically its
requirement that treaty terms be given their "ordinary meaning in their context
53 See Mortenson, supra note 22, at 259-260 ("Throughout the lengthy negotiating process, two blocs of
countries clashed repeatedly over the scope of ICSID jurisdiction. A group led by developed countries
advocated a wide-open jurisdiction over any foreign enterprise, while a group dominated by developing
countries pushed to strictly limit ICSID review to narrow categories of economic activity. The
jurisdictional maximalists eventually won out, but only after making an important concession. In
exchange for a definition of 'investment' that would extend jurisdiction to any plausibly economic asset
or activity, the Convention created a set of opt-out mechanisms that individual countries could use to
tailor the forms of investment eligible for protection in their particular cases."). See also Ambiente
Ufficio Jurisdiction, supra note 4, In 449-450, 454; SCHREUER II, supra note 17, art. 25, 119; Castro
de Figueiredo, supra note 14, at 456.
14 See, e.g., C.F. Amerasinghe, The Jurisdiction oftthe Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes,
19 INDIN J. INT'L L. 166, 180 (1979).
" See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLT].
16 But see Schwebel, supra note 20, at 63 ("There may be room in some cases of negotiation of
multilateral treaties to discount the preparatory work.... But in the case of the negotiation of the ICSID
Convention, the record is complete, readily available, and sufficiently clear to justify invocation of and
reliance upon the travauxpr6paratoires.").
" VCLT, supra note 55, art. 32 (emphasis added). Pursuant to VCLT Article 32, recourse to negotiating
history may be had to either confirm an interpretation pursuant to Article 31, or where an Article 31
interpretation "[1eaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure" or "[1]eads to a result which is manifestly
absurd or unreasonable." Id art. 32; cf Julian Davis Mortenson, The Travaux qfTravaux: Is the Vienna
Convention Hostile to Drafting History?, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 780, 781 (2013) (the travaux of the
Vienna Convention establishes that the Convention's drafters "sought to secure [the role of negotiating
history] as a regular, central, and indeed crucial component of treaty interpretation" and that "[i]n any
seriously contested case, interpreters were thus expected automatically to assess the historical evidence
about the course of discussions, negotiations, and compromises that resulted in the treaty text").
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and in light of [the treaty's] object and purpose"-remains the mandatory
starting point for all treaty interpretation.
While VCLT Article 31 allows some role for the parties' subjective
definition of "investment" in the interpretation of the ICSID Convention, it is a
limited role at best.58 BITs cannot modify or amend the meaning of "investment"
in Article 25. VCLT Article 41(1) only allows bilateral modification of a
multilateral treaty if the possibility of modification is provided for by the treaty,
or, if neither provided for nor prohibited, such modification "does not affect the
enjoyment by other parties of their rights under the treaty or the performance of
51 Pursuant to VCLT Article 31(2), "[t]he context for the purposes of interpretation" includes "the
treaty's text, including its preamble and annexes," as well as (a) "[a]ny agreement relating to the treaty
which was made between all the parties" and (b) "[a]ny instrument which was made by one or more
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty." VCLT, supra note 55, art. 31(2). BITs and any definition of"investment"
contained therein plainly do not constitute the "treaty text." Nor do they constitute an "agreement
relating to the treaty between all the parties," or an "instrument... accepted by the other parties." They
are separate agreements, between a subset (usually two) of the 153 State parties to the ICSID
Convention. BITs, therefore, do not form part of the context in which Article 25 of the ICSID
Convention must be interpreted.
VCLT Article 31(3) further provides that tribunals shall take into account (a) "[any
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of
its provisions" and (b) "[a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation." Id. art. 31(3). BITs are neither of these. An
agreement between two of 153 State parties cannot "establish the agreement of the parties regarding
[the] interpretation" of the other 151 members. See Castro de Figueiredo, supra note 14, at 471-472. See
also Ambiente Ufficio Jurisdiction, supra note 4, 439 ("the limits set by Art. 25(1) ICSID Convention
are not subject to consensual change"); Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
Dissenting opinion of Professor Abi-Saab on Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 46 (August
4, 2011) [hereinafter Abaclat Dissent on Jurisdiction] ("the term has a hard-core that cannot be waived
even by agreement of States parties to a BIT"); SCHREUER II, supra note 17, art. 25, 144 ("The broad
similarity of definitions of BITs does not mean that they reflect a general definition for the Convention's
concept of investment. Rather, these definitions are part of the specific conditions of consent governing
individual relationships."). But see Biwater Award, supra note 49, 314 ("If very substantial numbers
of BITs across the world express the definition of 'investment' more broadly than the Salini Test, and if
this constitutes any type of international consensus, it is difficult to see why the ICSID Convention
ought to be read more narrowly."); Mihaly Award, supra note 49, 58 ("In the absence of a generally
accepted definition of investment for the purpose of the ICSID Convention, the Tribunal must examine
the current and past practice of ICSID and the practice of States as evidenced in multilateral and
bilateral treaties and agreements binding on States, notably the United States-Sri Lanka BIT.").
At most, BITs may constitute "relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties," pursuant to VCLT Article 31(3)(c). Pursuant to Article 31(3)(c), together with the
context, tribunals "shall take[] into account," "[a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties." VCLT, supra note 55, art. 31(3)(c). BITs may constitute "relevant rules
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties" pursuant to Article 31(3)(c). The
"rules of international law" referred to in that article are recognized as including all sources of
international law, as recognized by Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. See
RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 260-61 (2008). Those sources include "international
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
States" and "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists." Statute of the
International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), Oct. 24, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
59 See Castro de Figueiredo, supra note 14, at 471-472. Contra Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services
Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, 305 (Aug. 16, 2007)
("In bilateral investment treaties which incorporate an ICSID arbitration option, the word 'investment' is
a term of art, whose content in each instance is to be determined by the language of the pertinent BIT
which serves as a lex specialis with respect to Article 25 of the Washington Convention.").
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their obligations." 60 Expanding ICSID jurisdiction beyond Article 25
"investment" would impose additional obligations upon other Contracting
States, including a potential increase in financial and enforcement obligations
resulting from a larger ICSID caseload.61
Moreover, complete deference to parties' subjective definition of
"investment" would effectively nullify the term in Article 25. That Article
provides that jurisdiction ."shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out
of an investment... which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit
to the Centre." Complete deference to definitions of "investment" in Contracting
States' consent documents would destroy the effect of the entire first clause by
"merg[ing] the requisite of investment with the condition of consent. '62
At the very least, therefore, the term "investment" must be accorded
some "objective meaning independent of the parties' disposition."63 It cannot be
"infinitively elastic" so as to encompass any type of activity that manifestly does
not fit within it.64 In practice, ascribing an objective meaning to Article 25
"investment" means ensuring that the tribunal has jurisdiction pursuant to the
ICSID Convention and the consent document. Under this test, States can restrict
the definition of "investment" by way of their BITs, but they cannot expand it
by consenting to disputes that do not arise directly out of an Article 25
"investment." 65 This so-called "double-barreled" test 66 has more recently
become accepted practice.
67
D. The Debate over the Objective Meaning of "Investment"
Determining that the term "investment" has an objective meaning
provides no insight into what that meaning is. Thus, even as a consensus has
0 VCLT, supra note 55, art. 41(1).
61 Castro de Figueiredo, supra note 14, at 480-481.
62 Emmanuel Gaillard, Identify or Define? Reflections on the Evolution of the Concept of Investment in
ICSID Practice, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21s CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 403, 410 (2009). Merging the jurisdictional requirement of "investment" with
consent is also inconsistent with Rule 2 of ICSID's Institution Rules, which requires a request for
arbitration to identify not just the parties' consent, but also that the dispute arises directly out of an
investment. SCHREUER II, supra note 17, art. 25, 123. But see A. Broches, The Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes: Some Observations on Jurisdiction, 5 COL. J. TRANSNT'L L. 263, 268
(1966) ("During the negotiations several definitions of 'investment' were considered and rejected. It was
felt in the end that a definition could be dispensed with 'given the essential requirement of consent by
the parties.' This indicates that the requirement that the dispute must have arisen out of an 'investment'
may be merged into the requirement of consent to jurisdiction.").
63 SCHREUER II, supra note 17, art. 25, 123. See also e.g., Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of
Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Award Rendered,
31 (Nov. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Mitchell v. Congo Annulment] ("[T]he parties to an agreement and the
States which conclude an investment treaty cannot open the jurisdiction of the Centre to any operation
they might arbitrarily qualify as an investment. It is thus repeated that, before ICSID arbitral tribunals,
the Washington Convention has supremacy over an agreement between the parties or a BIT.").
6 Waibel, supra note 11, at 722.
63 See, e.g., Phoenix v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, $T 82, 96 (Apr. 15, 2009).
66 See SCHREUER II, supra note 17, art. 25, 124.
67 Castro de Figueiredo, supra note 14, at 457.
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formed that Article 25 "investment" must have some objective meaning, the
debate over that meaning has remained "intens[e]. 6 8
Amid that debate, one positive definition and one negative definition
have prevailed above the rest. The prevailing positive definition, 69 known as
Salini test, defines "investment" by certain positive attributes that are inherent to
it. The negative definition of "investment," on the other hand, defines the term
by what it is not.
1. A Positive Definition of "Investment"
Beginning with Fedax v. Venezuela 70 in 1997 and then Salini v.
Morocco in 2001,71 tribunals began to apply a multi-part test to determine
whether the activity giving rise to the dispute constituted an Article 25
"investment." 72 This test, which would become known as the Salini test, consists
of a descriptive list of features that Christoph Schreuer observed to be "typical
to most of the operations" subject to ICSID arbitration. 73 While various versions
of the test have been applied, the original characteristics identified by Schreuer
included: (i) "a certain duration"; (ii) "a certain regularity ofprofit and return";
(iii) "assumption of risk usually by both sides"; (iv) "commitment [that] is
substantial"; and (v) "significance for the host State's development.,74 This test
gained popularity with time, 75 becoming what some have described as the
"prevailing approach in ICSID practice." 76
The Salini test has nevertheless remained highly controversial and the
subject of significant debate. 77 The tribunal in Biwater Gauffv. Tanzania leveled
the most obvious critique against it: "[The Salini factors] do not appear in the
ICSID Convention." 78 Nor are they supported by the negotiation history, which
Ambiente Ufficio Jurisdiction, supra note 4, 442.
6 Castro de Figueiredo, supra note 14, at 458. See also id. at 457 ("Most ICSID tribunals that were
required to decide on the fulfillment of the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention followed
the objectivist theory and applied the double-barreled test approach in investment treaty disputes.").
7' Fedax Jurisdiction, supra note 48.
71 Salini Jurisdiction, supra note 13.
72 SCHREUER II, supra note 17, art. 25, 154-155, 160.731 d., art. 25, 153; SCHREUER I, supra note 13, art. 25 122.
74 SCHREUER I, supra note 13, art. 25 122. The tribunal in Salini identified them as: (i) a contribution,
(ii) a certain duration, (iii) an element of risk, and (iv) a contribution to the host State's economic
development. Salini Jurisdiction, supra note 13, IM 50-58.
75 Mortenson, supra note 22, at 277.
76 Castro de Figueiredo, supra note 14, at 458.
" Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 15, at 97 ("Rarely has an arbitral award been as celebrated or
criticized as Salini ... ").
" Biwater Award, supra note 49, 312. See Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 364 (August 4, 2011) [hereinafter Abaclat
Jurisdiction] ("Considering that these criteria were never included in the ICSI) Convention, while being
controversial and having been applied by tribunals in varying manners and degrees, the Tribunal does
not see any merit in following and copying the Salini criteria. The Salini criteria may be useful to further
describe what characteristics contributions may or should have. They should, however, not serve to




shows that the Convention's drafters considered and rejected proposed
defmitions of "investment" containing at least some of the factors enumerated in
Salini.7 9
The genesis of the Salini test raises other serious problems as well. As
noted, the Salini test adopted a descriptive list of features that Schreuer identified
as "typical to most of the operations" subject to ICSID arbitration to date. Had
other arbitrations been brought with respect to other activities exhibiting other
"features" than the ones brought by 2001 when Schreuer wrote his first treatise,
the Salini test might be broader than it is. Under its inductive logic, however, the
limitations it imposes justify themselves through self-perpetuation. Schreuer
himself expressed regret that the features he described as "typical" 80 were being
used as a jurisdictional test. In the Second Edition of his Commentary on the
ICSID Convention, he called the move "unfortunate," and insisted that "[t]he
First Edition of the Commentary cannot serve as authority for this
development.,
81
Even among those who accept the Salini test, there has been significant
debate and divergence over how it should be applied. This divergence has
extended to tribunals, which tend to rely on, but are not bound by, case
precedent. 82 Some tribunals have interpreted the Salini criteria as essential
elements of "investment" and have required proof of each before accepting
jurisdiction.83 Others have taken a softer "intuitive" approach, 4 finding that the
7 See Mortenson, supra note 22, at 260. Mortenson argues that the drafters explicitly rejected "three
core criteria" of the Salini test, including contribution, duration, and the requirement that the investment
be in the public interest. Id. at 286, 287, 289. See also id. at 286 (noting a tabled proposal to define
investment as "any contribution of money or other asset of economic value for an indefinite period or, if
the period be defined, for not less than five years" and a proposal to require that investments be
"regarded as being of public interest").
" SCHREUER I, supra note 13, art. 25, 122.
81 SCHREUER II, supra note 17, art. 25, 171-174.
82 The tribunal in Saba Fakes v. Turkey described and adopted a typical approach to precedent when it
explained: "The Tribunal is not bound by the decisions adopted by previous ICSID tribunals. At the
same time, it believes that it should pay due regard to earlier decisions of such tribunals. The present
Tribunal shares the opinion of the Tribunal in the Bayindir v. Pakistan case that, unless there are
compelling reasons to the contrary, it ought to follow solutions established in a series of consistent cases
that are comparable to the case at hand, subject to the specificity of the treaty under consideration and
the circumstances of the case." Saba Fakes Award, supra note 4, 96 (citing Bayindir Insaat Turizm
Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case. No. ARB/03/29, Decision on
Jurisdiction (Nov. 14, 2005) [hereinafter Bayindir Jurisdiction]).
83 See, e.g., Quiborax S.A. & Non Metallic Minerals S.A. & Allan Fosk Kaplitn v. Plurinational State of
Bolivia, ICSID Case. No. ARB/06/2, Decision on Jurisdiction (Sept. 27, 2012) [hereinafter Quiborax
Jurisdiction]; Victor Pey Casado v. Chile, lCS1D Case No. ARB/98/2, Award (May 8, 2008); loannis
Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, Decision on Jurisdiction (July 6, 2007);
Saipem, S.p.A. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures (Mar. 21, 2007); Jan de Nul, N.V. v. Arab
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case. No. ARB/04/13, Decision on Jurisdiction (June 16, 2006) [hereinafter
Jan de Nul Jurisdiction]; Bayindir Jurisdiction, supra note 82; Consorzio Groupement L.E.S.I.-Dipenta
v. People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/8, Award for Lack of Jurisdiction
(Jan. 10, 2005) [hereinafter L.E.S.I. jurisdiction]; Mihaly Award, supra note 49.
84 Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 15, at 112.
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Salini criteria are merely indicative of the existence of an "investment," and not
hard-and-fast requirements. 85
Tribunals and commentators have also diverged on how to interpret the
Salini criteria. On the one hand, a liberal interpretation of the Salini criteria could
encompass virtually any type of economic activity. For example, literally every
human activity has a duration and entails some risk.86 On the other hand,
tribunals seeking to reject a dispute can find ample reason to do so within the
test's parameters. The test's capacious qualifiers-including a "substantial"
commitment, a "certain" duration, and "significance" for the host State's
development, 87 -allow for wide discretion, or, to put it differently, "a free choice
for tribunals."
88
2. A Negative Definition of "Investment"
While the Salini test purports to describe what an "investment" is, the
negative definition of "investment" purports to describe what it is not. According
to this definition, an "investment" is not "a simple sale of goods" or an "ordinary
commercial transaction."
In contrast to the Salini test, the negative definition has been almost
entirely uncontroversial and subject to near-universal acceptance. It has been
observed that "simple sales and purchases of goods.., clearly do not qualify as
investments," 89 and that "a sale of goods transaction ... manifestly could not be
considered an investment." 90 The tribunal in Alps Finance described the
exclusion of so-called commercial transactions from investor-State arbitration as
nothing less than a "constant jurisprudential trend." 91 Even those, such as Justice
8 5See, e.g., Hassan Awdi, Enterprise Business Consultants, Inc. and Alfa El Corporation v. Romania,
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/1 3, Award, 197 (Mar. 2,2014) (objective criteria "may be useful to describe
typical characteristics of an investment, but they cannot, as a rule, override the will of the parties, given
the undefined and somewhat flexible term used by the drafters of the ICSID Convention"); Abaclat
Jurisdiction, supra note 78, 364 ("The Salini criteria may be useful to further describe what
characteristics contributions may or should have. They should, however, not serve to create a limit,
which the Convention itself nor the Contracting Parties to a specific BIT intended to create."); Biwater
Award, supra note 49, T 316 ("The Arbitral Tribunal therefore considers that a more flexible and
pragmatic approach to the meaning of 'investment' is appropriate, which takes into account the features
identified in Salini, but along with all the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the
instrument containing the relevant consent to ICSLD.").
86 See e.g., Pogtovfi Banka, A.S. and Istrokapital SE v. Hellenic Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8,
Award, 367 (Apr. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Pogtovd Banka Award] ("Risk is inherent in life and cannot
per se qualify what is an investment."). All for-profit economic activity also involves a "contribution" of
some sort. Moreover, if it is voluntarily entered into and is done so with the expectation of "profit" by
both sides, it arguably contributes to economic growth and "development." See infra text accompanying
note 258.
87 (Emphasis added). Notably, none of these qualifiers has an obvious basis in the ordinary meaning of
"investment."
88 See Reisman & Vinnik, supra note 9, at 70.
89 SCHREUER I, supra note 13, art. 25, 120.
SI.F.I. Shihata & A.R. Parra, The Experience of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, 14 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 299, 308 (1999).
91 Alps Finance Award, supra note 22, 245.
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Schwebel, who favor giving "great weight"92 to the consent of the contracting
parties, have accepted that "that the term 'investment' does not mean 'sale,"'
' 93
and that "a simple sale of goods and like transient transactions" are beyond the
outer limits of ICSID's jurisdiction. 94 The notion that "investment" excludes so-
called "ordinary commercial transactions" has been so widely adopted that
tribunals have invoked it even when the ICSID Convention and its Article 25's
jurisdictional requirements do not apply.95 This near-unanimous consensus is
remarkable given the spirited debate that surrounds nearly every other aspect of
the "investment" question. Indeed, it might be the only point in this debate on
which commentators and tribunals agree. 96
Ill. THE COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION TEST
In spite (or perhaps because) of its near-universal acceptance, there has
been scant examination of how the negative definition of "investment" has been
applied and with what effect. The literature has instead focused almost
exclusively on the Salini test and on the seemingly arbitrary results that tribunals
have reached on the "investment" question without examining the role that the
commercial-investment distinction has played in those results.97
To address this gap in the literature, I have conducted a comprehensive
review of published investor-State jurisdictional awards that have turned on the
objective definition of "investment. '98 That review shows that, in attempting to
give effect to the negative definition of "investment," tribunals have effectively
created a distinct jurisdictional test, which I dub the commercial transaction test.
This test ascribes certain positive attributes to investments-based on but distinct
92 Schwebel, supra note 20, at 55.
93 d. at 60.
94 d. at 58. See also SGS Socidtd General de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 133, n. 153 (Aug. 6,2003) [hereinafter SGS v.
Pakistan Jurisdiction ] ("That freedom [of the parties' to define 'investment'] does not, however, appear
to be unlimited, considering that 'investment' may well be regarded as embodying certain core meaning
which distinguishes it from 'an ordinary commercial transaction' such as a simple, stand alone, sale of
goods or services."); Fedax Jurisdiction, supra note 48, 28 ("However, under both ICSID and the
Additional Facility Rules the investment in question, even if indirect, should be distinguishable from an
ordinary commercial transaction. The Tribunal shall consider the question of distinguishing between an
investment and an ordinary commercial transaction in this case further below."); id. 42 ("The nature of
the transactions involved in this case, and the fact that they qualify as a foreign investment for the
purposes of the Convention and the Agreement, serves to distinguish them from an ordinary commercial
transaction."); Ambiente Ufficio Jurisdiction, supra note 4, 470 ("In fact, there are good reasons to
leave a single commercial transaction such as the delivery of a single load of cars outside the concept of
investment and thus outside the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Centre.").
'5 See infra Sections II.A.3, III.A.5 & III.A.6.
9 See Mortenson, supra note 22, at 316 ("If commentators agree on anything in this area, it is that pure
trade transactions should not be subject to ICSID jurisdiction."). See also Exelbert, supra note 22, at
1272.
9' See supra Section n.D. 1.
" This review included all awards published by the Investor State Law Guide database that reference
"Article 25" of the ICSID Convention, as of October 1, 2019. Eleven such awards rejected jurisdiction
on the basis that the underlying asset or transaction at issue was not an investment in an "objective"
sense, independent of how the parties defined the term.
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from the Salini criteria-in order to distinguish investments from commercial
activities.
As measured by the number of negative jurisdictional holdings it has
justified, the commercial transaction test has had an effect equal to or greater
than the far more scrutinized and debated Salini test. Far from being a minor
doctrine in international investment law, it has been a driving force behind the
denial of jurisdiction on Article 25 "investment" grounds.
A. Awards Denying Jurisdiction Based on the "Commercial"
Nature of the Transaction
Since the late 1990s, at least eleven investor-State tribunals have
rejected jurisdiction over claims because the transaction or asset underlying the
claim did not meet the "objective" definition of "investment." 99 Eight of those
denials were justified in whole or in part by the conclusion that the underlying
economic activity was "commercial" in nature or subject to "normal commercial
I do not count awards that dismissed jurisdiction on grounds that the investment was illegal, not bona
fide or because of the claimant's lack of relationship to the investment. I do not count these awards,
because they do not turn on the nature of the underlying transaction and whether it is an "objective"
investment. Illegal and bad faith investments may not be covered by the ICSID Convention, but they are
still investments. See Quiborax Jurisdiction, supra note 83, 226 ("An illegal or bad faith investment
remains an investment. It may not be a protected investment, i.e. deserve protection in the sense that
access to treaty arbitration and/or substantive treaty guarantees may not be granted, but that is a different
matter."). See also Saba Fakes Award, supra note 4, 1 112 ("[A]n investment might be 'legal' or
'illegal,' made in 'good faith' or not, it nonetheless remains an investment.").
Likewise, whether a claimant owns an investment and is therefore a protected investor with
standing to bring a claim is a different question than whether the asset or transaction at issue is in and of
itself an investment. See Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, Second
Partial Award on Track II 7.69 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Aug. 30, 2018) ("An 'investment' identifies the
subject-matter protected by the Treaty, as distinct from the person making that 'investment."');
Quiborax Jurisdiction, supra note 83, 233 ("According to Bolivia, a distinction should be made
between the objects of an investment, 'such as shares or concessions... and the action of investing.'
The Tribunal agrees. While shares or other securities or title may be the legal materialization of an
investment, mere ownership of a share is, in and of itself, insufficient to prove a contribution of money
or assets.").
Indeed, several awards that dismissed jurisdiction on the ground that the claimant was not an
investor, expressly found that the asset or transaction at issue was nevertheless an "investment." See,
e.g., Socidtd Civile Immobiliere de Gaeta v. Republique de'Guinee, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/36,
Sentence, TT 253, 273, 274 (Dec. 21, 2015) ("Au vu de ce qui prdcede, le Tribunal arbitral considre
qu'un investissement a bien dtd effectud en lien avec la Cit6 de Chemins de fer et le Contrat de Bail A
Construction au sens du CDI et de la Convention CIRDI .... [Mais] [p]uisque la Demanderesse n'a pas
prouvd qu'elle a effectud un apport substantiel au sens de l'article 25 de la Convention CIRDI... le
Tribunal arbitral estime que li Demanderesse n'a pas effectud d'investissement en Rdpublique de
Guinre en lien avec la construction de la Citd de Chemins de fer."); Quiborax Jurisdiction, supra note
83, 233, 237 (finding that while shareholding in a mining venture constituted an investment, those
same shares did not constitute an investment where they were simply received as part of a legal
formality, as was the case with respect to one of the claimants in the arbitration).
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terms," while only one 1°° turned on a neutral application of the Salini test.10 1
Two others turned on other considerations.'
0 2
In this sub-Section, I summarize the eight awards that found that the
underlying transaction was commercial in nature and therefore not an
investment. As discussed in the following sub-Section, these awards demonstrate
that the negative definition of "investment" has been operationalized as a distinct
jurisdictional test.
1. Joy Mining v. Egypt
103
In 2004, the tribunal in Joy Mining v. Egypt found that an engineering,
delivery and maintenance contract did not constitute an Article 25 "investment."
Joy Mining, an English company, had brought an arbitration seeking the release
of bank guarantees that it had issued in favor of Egypt as security for its
performance of a contract. The contract required Joy Mining to engineer and
design a longwall mining system and deliver certain mining materials and
equipment. 104 The contract also established technical assistance and
maintenance obligations that lasted six months and ten years respectively.'
0 5
In its jurisdictional analysis, the tribunal adopted the theory of
"economic unity"' 0 6 and examined the bank guarantees in the broader context of
" In Mitchell v. Congo, the ICSID Annulment Committee annulled a tribunal's award finding that a law
firm in the Democratic Republic of Congo did in fact constitute an Article 25 "investment." The basis of
the Annulment Committee's decision was that the law firm in question did not contribute to the host
State's development, which is a factor under the Salini test. The Annulment Committee made clear that
"the existence of a contribution to the economic development of the host State [is] an essential-
although not sufficient-characteristic or unquestionable criterion of the investment .... Mitchell v.
Congo Annulment, supra note 63, 33.
... I define a neutral application of the Salini test according to the elements laid out in Salini: (i) a
contribution, (ii) a certain duration, (iii) an element of risk, and (iv) a contribution to the host State's
economic development. Salini Jurisdiction, supra note 13, 50-58.
102 The tribunal in Mihaly v. Sri Lanka rejected jurisdiction over a dispute arising from pre-contract
expenditures associated with a power-generation project. while the parties had signed a letter of intent,
no binding contract was entered into with respect to the project, and thus no investment was found to
exist. Mihaly Award, supra note 49, 59-61. The tribunal, however, did not appear to apply the Salini
test. In addition, a Stockholm Chamber of Commerce tribunal concluded that funds transferred in a
Cypriot bank did not constitute an investment "as the funds were not aimed at being invested in
Cyprus," but in a company located in Poland. The tribunal based its decision on the fact that "[t]he Bank
of Cyprus where the funds were located was a go between pending transfer of the funds to Poland,"
which occurred "within a very short time period," and on the fact that the claimants themselves
disclaimed that the funds were the investment. See Czescik & Aleksandrowicz v. Republic of Cyprus,
SCC Case No. V 2014/169, Final Award, N 198-99 (Feb. 11 2017).
103 Joy Mining Machinery Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/1 1, Award on
Jurisdiction (Aug. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Joy Mining Jurisdiction].
°4 -1d. 37.
105 Id.
106 The theory of"economic unity" is premised on the fact that "[a]n investment is frequently a rather
complex operation, composed of various interrelated transactions, each element of which, standing
alone, might not in all cases qualify as an investment," but which should for jurisdictional purposes be
examined in the broader context of the overall investment. CSOB Jurisdiction, supra note 49, 72. In
practical terms, the application of the economic unity theory means that certain transactions, which are
found to be merely commercial and thus not investments in and of themselves, may nevertheless be
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the "operation ... as a whole." 10 7 The tribunal concluded that the essence of the
contract was to replace and procure mining equipment, which was "an element
of normal sales contracts."l°8 The tribunal found that the addition of other
services did "not transform the Contract into an investment" 109 and that the
"terms of the Contract are entirely normal commercial terms."11 It noted that
"[r]isk there might be indeed, but it is not different from that involved in any
commercial contract, including the possibility of the termination of the
Contract."" 1 Further, the tribunal noted that it was "mindful that if a distinction
is not drawn between ordinary sales contracts, even if complex, and an
investment, the result would be that any sales or procurement contract involving
a State agency would qualify as an investment."
' 12
2. Malaysian Historical Salvors v. Malaysia
113
In 2007, the tribunal in Malaysian Historical Salvors v. Malaysia denied
jurisdiction over a contract for the recovery of shipwreck cargo off the coast of
Malaysia on the grounds that the contract was not an "investment" under Article
25 of the ICSID Convention. Pursuant to its contract with Malaysia, the claimant
was "to survey, identify, classify, research, restore, preserve, appraise, market,
sell/auction and carry out a scientific survey and salvage of the wreck and
contents.. . believed to be the Wreck 'DIANA."' 1 14 All of the costs of the search
and recovery operation were to be borne by the claimant, and the claimant was
to be compensated exclusively by a percentage of the proceeds Malaysia
obtained by auctioning any recovered cargo. The survey and salvage operation
took almost four years and yielded 24,000 recovered items. "1
5
In an award that would later be overturned by the ICSID Annulment
Committee," 6 the tribunal found that the survey and salvage contract failed to
exhibit any of the Salini criteria. Specifically, it found that "Claimant's
contributions [were] largely similar to those which might have been made under
a commercial salvage contract."'1 17 Moreover, it found that the risks assumed
were "no more than ordinary commercial risks assumed by many salvors in a
covered by ICSID Convention Article 25 if they are "an integral part" of a qualifying investment. Id.
See also SCHREUER IL supra note 17, art. 25, 565.
107 Joy Mining Jurisdiction, supra note 103, 54.
108 Id. 55 (emphasis added).
109 Id.
"1O Id. 7 56 (emphasis added).
.. Id. 57 (emphasis added).
112 Id. T 58 (emphasis added).
"3 Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN, BHD v. Government of Malaysia, ICSID Case. No. ARB/05/10,
Award on Jurisdiction (May 17, 2007) [hereinafter Malaysian Historical Salvors Award].
14 Malaysian Historical Salvors Annulment, supra note 16, 2 (quoting the contract between the
parties).
"5 Malaysian Historical Salvors Award, supra note 113, IN 7-14.
..6 Malaysian Historical Salvors Annulment, supra note 16. The Annulment Committee annulled the
jurisdictional decision on the grounds that it failed to consider that the contract fell squarely within the
definition of"investment" in the applicable BIT. It did not, however, question the tribunal's analysis as
to the relevance of the commercial nature of the contract.
"s7 Malaysian Historical Salvors Award, supra note 113, 109.
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salvage contract,"1 18 and that "under ICSID practice and jurisprudence . . . an
ordinary commercial contract cannot be considered as an 'investment."'
1 1 9
Finally, the tribunal found the benefits to Malaysia's economy "Were no different
from the benefits flowing to the place of the performance of any normal service
contract."'
20
3. Romak v. Uzbekistan
121
In 2009, the tribunal in Romak v. Uzbekistan found that a contract for
the sale of up to 50,000 tons of wheat over a five-month period did not constitute
an investment. While the tribunal was not an ICSID tribunal and was instead
constituted pursuant to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, it nevertheless sought
to interpret the term "investment" as contained within the Swiss-Uzbek BIT in
accordance with Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. 122 The tribunal found that
the transfer of wheat did not constitute a contribution, but was rather "a transfer
of title in performance of a sale of goods contract [because] Romak did not
deliver the wheat as a contribution in kind in furtherance of a venture." 123 The
tribunal further concluded that the five-month span of wheat deliveries under the
contract did not satisfy the "duration" requirement, as it did "not reflect a
commitment on the part of Romak beyond a one-off transaction, and is not of
the sort normally associated with 'investments' according to the common
understanding of the term." 124 Finally, the tribunal found that the wheat
deliveries did not satisfy the requirement of "risk." It found that "risk assumed
by Romak was . . . circumscribed to the possible non-payment of the wheat
delivery, which is the ordinary commercial or business risk assumed by all those
who enter into a contractual relationship., 125
4. Global Trading Resource Corp. v. Ukraine
126
.Id. 112 (emphasis added).
'19 Id. (citing Shihata & Parra, supra note 90, at 308).
I2°1d. 144 (emphasis added).
121 Romak S.A. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, PCA Case No. AA280, Award (Nov. 26, 2009) [hereinafter
Romak Award].
22 The tribunal reasoned that this was appropriate as the BIT in question allowed for the choice of either
UNCITRAL or ICSID arbitration. The tribunal found that it would be inappropriate to ignore Article 25,
as that "would imply that the substantive protection offered by the BIT would be narrowed or widened,
as the case may be, merely by virtue of a choice between the various dispute resolution mechanisms
sponsored by the Treaty. This would be both absurd and unreasonable." Id. 193,194.
123 Id. 222 (emphasis added).
114 Id. 226-227 (emphasis added).
125 Id. 231 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the tribunal came to this conclusion despite holding "the
view that Contracting States are free to deem any kind of asset or economic transaction to constitute an
investment as subject to treaty protection. Contracting States can even go as far as stipulating that a
'pure' one-off sales contract constitutes an investment, even if such a transaction would not normally be
covered by the ordinary meaning of the term 'investment.' However, in such cases, the wording of the
instrument in question must leave no room for doubt that the intention of the Contracting States was to
accord to the term 'investment' an extraordinary and counterintuitive meaning." Id. 205.
126 Global Trading Resource Corp. and Globex International, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No.
ARB/09/1 1, Award (Dec. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Global Trading Resource Award].
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In 2010, the tribunal in Global Trading Resource Corp. v. Ukraine
found that a contract for the delivery of poultry did not qualify as an Article 25
"investment." 127 The tribunal found that "the purchase and sale contracts
entered into by the Claimants were pure commercial transactions and therefore
cannot qualify as an investment for the purposes of Article 25 of the
Convention."' 128 The tribunal noted that the "these are each individual contracts,
of limited duration, for the purchase and sale of goods, on a commercial basis
[] under normal CIF trading terms[;]... contracts of that kind... cannot by any
reasonable process of interpretation be construed to be 'investments' for the
purposes of the ICSID Convention."1 29 In justifying its refusal to admit the
claim, the tribunal cited the Annulment Committee in Malaysian Historical
Salvors v. Malaysia, which had noted that "[i]t appears to have been assumed by
the Convention's drafters that the use of the term 'investment' excluded a simple
sale and like transient commercial transactions from the jurisdiction of the
Centre."'
130
5. Alps Finance v. Slovak Republic
13 1
In 2011, the tribunal in Alps Finance v. Slovak Republic rejected
jurisdiction over an assignment contract that transferred certain receivables from
a private Slovak company to the claimant on the basis that neither the assignment
contract nor any broader activity it was connected to constituted an "investment."
The receivables consisted of payments owed by a bankrupt company to the
assignor. 132 As in Romak, the tribunal was constituted pursuant to the
UNCITRAL Rules, but it nevertheless interpreted the underlying BIT's
definition of "investment" in the context of "the practice of investment
arbitrations" interpreting Article 25 of the ICSID Convention.' 33 The tribunal
found that even though the assignment contract was an "asset," and that the BIT
in question covered "every kind of asset," the assignment contract was not an
investment because it was:
not a contract with an ongoing duration [but] rather a contract
which exhausts its object and purpose by its sole stipulation
by the parties and the effects of which-the assignment-take





129 Id. (emphasis added).
13 Id. 55 (quoting Malaysian Historical Salvors Award, supra note 113, 69).
13' Alps Finance Award, supra note 22, 245.
132 Id. TT 229-247.
113 Id. T 240 ("The present Tribunal is not an ICSID tribunal and its conclusion under the BIT could be
viewed as sufficient for denying jurisdiction. However, as earlier observed, the BIT definition of
investment is not an entirely self-standing concept, but refers to a more general concept given by
international law rules."). See also id. 239 (The term "investment" in BITs "explicitly or implicitly
refers to an 'objective definition' [of investment] given by international law... [from] which [tribunals]
cannot grossly depart .... [A]lthough the BIT gives a broad 'investment' definition, the two
Contracting States must have inevitably intended to refer to what constitutes 'investment' under the
ICSID Convention" as "the BIT here in question also provides for... ICSID arbitration.").
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contract, by which one party sells to the other certain
receivables .... 134
The tribunal noted that investments exhibited "operational risk[]," ' 135
but no such risk existed here, ostensibly because "it t[ook] place immediately." 136
Moreover, the tribunal noted that "[t]he constant jurisprudential trend has led the
most prominent doctrine to exclude in categorical terms that a mere one-off sale
transaction might qualify as an investment." 137 It concluded that if the more
complex transaction in Joy Mining "was no more than 'a sale,"' the assignment
contract before it was "afortiori" not an investment.1 38
6. Nova Scotia Power v. Venezuela
139
In 2014, the tribunal in Nova Scotia Power v. Venezuela concluded that
a coal supply contract, pursuant to which a Venezuelan state company agreed to
supply certain quantities of coal at certain prices over the course of four years
and the claimant agreed to pay for such coal as delivery was completed, did not
constitute an investment by the claimant. 140 The tribunal was constituted
pursuant to the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, such that Article 25's
"investment" requirement did not apply.14 ' The tribunal nevertheless adopted an
objective definition of "investment" when interpreting the underlying BIT at
issue, concluding that the BIT's definition "cannot be considered self-
sufficient,"' 142 and that the term "investment" "requires contribution, duration
and risk. "143 The tribunal found that neither the contribution' 44 nor risk elements
were present. It reasoned that "[i]t may be that any transaction involves a risk,
but what is required for an investment is a risk that is distinguishable from the
type of risk that arises in an ordinary commercial transaction."145 The risk
identified here was the "simple risk of exposure to a higher price for a product"
134 Id. 232 (emphasis added).
135 Id. 241.
136 Id. 232.
137 Id. 245 (emphasis added).
13 Id. 244.
13' Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (Canada) v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/1 1/1, Excerpts of Award (30 April 2014) [hereinafter Nova Scotia Excerpts of the Award],
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3319.pdf.
140 See id. TT 91, 94, 95, 101.
141 ICSID Additional Facility Rules, art. 4(3) (Apr. 2006) [hereinafter ICSID Additional Facility Rules],
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/AFR English-final.pdf.
142 Nova Scotia Excerpts of the Award, supra note 139, 77; see also id. 80 ("[T]he Tribunal is not
convinced by the Claimant's argument that because Article 2(a) of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules
does not impose additional requirement to establish an 'investment' beyond that contained in the BIT (in
contrast to Article 25 of the ICSID Convention), the Tribunal should not look any further than the (self-
contained) definition of investment in Article 1(f) of the BIT.").
1 Id. 84 (emphasis in original).
'"Id. 82. See also id 97 ("A commitment to simply pay money in the future after delivery of goods
is inadequate to be considered as the contribution which forms the basis of an investment.").
"' Id. $ 105 (emphasis added).
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which amounted to "normal commercial terms"146 and "risk[] any coal buyer
could be exposed to in any coal purchase arrangement."
147
7. Pogtovd Banka v. Greece
148
In 2015, in Pogtovd Banka v. Greece, the tribunal found that Greek
sovereign bonds did not constitute Article 25 "investments" and rejected claims
brought by bondholders in connection with Greece's 2010 sovereign default.
149
In rejecting the bondholders' claims, the tribunal reasoned that "[a]n investment,
in the economic sense, is linked with a process of creation of value, which
distinguishes it clearly from a sale, which is a process of exchange of values."
150
The tribunal then found that the sale and purchase of sovereign bonds amounted
to a mere exchange of values, akin to the sale of goods-that is, "a process of
providing money for a given amount of money in return."'151 That distinguished
sovereign bonds from an investment, which "is linked with a process of creation
of value."' 152 Moreover, the tribunal noted that the Greek State, to whom the bond
proceeds flowed, was "not primarily an economic actor engaged in economic
ventures."' 153 Rather, the "State enters into numerous sales contracts to run its
different administrations," which, according to the tribunal, were not value-
creating ventures. 154 The tribunal further found that the bonds lacked the
requisite "operational risk" as defined by the Romak tribunal. 55 Because the
profits of the bonds were "ascertained" and did not "depend on the success or
failure of the economic venture concerned" (which was non-existent) the bonds
merely exhibited commercial or sovereign risk, and therefore were not
investments in the objective sense. 156
8. Tenaris v. Venezuela
157
In 2016, the tribunal in Tenaris v. Venezuela accepted jurisdiction over
the claimants' equity and debt investments in a Venezuelan enterprise that
" Id. 107 (emphasis added).
47 Id. 1 108, 113. Though it defined "investment" in opposition to "commercial" characteristics, it did
not reach the question of whether the underlying transaction at issue had "features which distinguish it
from an ordinary commercial transaction," which is a threshold for arbitration pursuant to the ICSID
Additional Facility Rules. Id. 146 (quoting ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 141, art. 4(3)).
See also infra Section IV.A.3.
148 Po~tovd Banka Award, supra note 86.
141 Id. 371. The tribunal also found that the bonds failed to constitute investments under the applicable
BIT. It therefore did not need to reach this question but did anyway. Id. 351.
"
0 d. 361 (emphasis added).
's' Id.
s2 Id. Notably, three other tribunals addressing the same jurisdictional question have come to the
opposite conclusion. See infra note 294 and accompanying text.




157Tenaris S.A. and Talta-Trading E Marketing Sociedade Unipessoal LDA v. Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, ICSID Case. No. ARB/1 1/26, Award (Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Tenaris Award].
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produced hot briquetted iron ("HBI"), but concluded that the long-term off-take
agreement between the claimants and the enterprise, by which the latter agreed
to sell certain quantities of HBI at certain prices to the former, was not an
"investment" pursuant to Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. 5 8 In reaching its
conclusion, the tribunal required that "the combined effect of the [a]greements
[be] more than an ordinary commercial transaction."'1 59 The tribunal found that
the off-take agreement, which was concluded concurrently with the debt and
equity investments in the Venezuelan affiliate, 160 "appears to have been a crucial
element in the decision to invest. ' 16 1 It nevertheless concluded that the off-take
agreement "remain[ed], in essence, a commercial agreement in respect of the
purchase and delivery ofproduct at a known price." 162
B. The Contours of the Commercial Transaction Test
The above cases reveal that tribunals have operationalized the negative
definition of "investment" as a distinct jurisdictional test, which this Article dubs
the commercial transaction test. Three characteristics can be ascribed to that test
from these awards.
1. The Investment-Commerce Distinction
First, in the eight awards summarized above, the tribunals' focus on the
commercial nature of the underlying transactions is unmistakable. The
commercial nature of the underlying subject matter was repeatedly a dispositive
factor in the denial of jurisdiction. For example:
a) In Joy Mining, the tribunal determined the contracts at issue
were "normal sales contracts,"'1 63 that the "terms of the Contract are
entirely normal commercial terms," 164 and that the risk was "not
different from that involved in any commercial contract., 165
b) In Malaysian Historical Salvors, the tribunal found that while
the claimant faced risk, that risk was no more than "ordinary
commercial risks assumed by many salvors," 1 66 and that the "benefits
flowing from the Contract were no different from the benefits flowing
to the place of the performance of any normal service contract."167
"
5 Id. 291.
SId. 284 (adopting the standard set forth in Mytilineos Holdings SA v. State Union of Serbia and
Montenegro, Partial Award on Jurisdiction, 120 (Sept. 8, 2006) (ad-hoc arbitration)).
16 0 Id. % 45-47.
161 Id. 533.
162 Id. 291 (emphasis added). The ultimate import of the tribunal's conclusion is unclear, as it
continued to consider the impact of the off-take agreement in its damages analysis. Id. T 533-549.
163 Joy Mining Jurisdiction, supra note 103, 55 (emphasis added).
6 Id. 7 56 (emphasis added).
165 Id. 57 (emphasis added).
166 Malaysian Historical Salvors Award, supra note 113, 7 112 (emphasis added).
167 Id. 144 (emphasis added).
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c) In Global Trading Resource Corp., the tribunal found that "the
purchase and sale contracts entered into by the Claimants were pure
commercial transactions and therefore cannot qualify as an investment
for the purposes of Article 25 of the Convention. 
68
d) In Tenaris, the tribunal found that an off-take agreement for the
purchase of HBI was not an investment but rather
"a commercial agreement in respect of the purchase and delivery of
product at a known price."
' ' 69
2. The Factors Applied to Distinguish Commercial from
Investment Activities
Second, these awards demonstrate that tribunals apply a set of factors to
distinguish investments from commercial transactions. The factors ascribe
certain positive characteristics to investments in order to distinguish them from
commercial transactions. These include the nature of the risk each type of
transaction faces, the type of contribution each entails, and the duration each type
of transaction exhibits. While these criteria are clearly based on the Salini
criteria, they are distinct from the Salini factors and engineered for the purpose
of giving effect to the negative definition of "investment." These factors are as
follows:
a) "Operational" or "Investment" Risk: Six awards distinguished
between investments and commercial transactions based upon the
nature of the risk each entails. The tribunals in Romak, Pogtovi Banka
and Nova Scotia Power required a showing of not just risk, but
"operational" or "investment" risk. 170 All three tribunals were
transparent that they did so for the purpose of distinguishing
investments from commercial transactions, as the general "risk"
criterion was not useful for making that distinction.171 The tribunal in
Alps Finance also noted that "sharing of operational risk" was inherent
in the objective definition of "investment." 172 The tribunals in Joy
Mining and Malaysian Historical Salvors similarly distinguished
between general risk "involved in any commercial contract" and the risk
associated with investments.'1 73
b) Value-Creating Venture: Two decisions distinguished between
investments and commercial activities based upon the type of
168 Global Trading Resource Award, supra note 126, 56 (emphasis added).
169 Tenaris Award, supra note 157, 291 (emphasis added).
170 Romak Award, supra note 121, 229-230; Pogtovd Banka Award, supra note 86, 369; Nova
Scotia Excerpts of the Award, supra note 139, In 105-108 (emphasis added).
171 Pogtovd Banka Award, supra note 86, 369; Nova Scotia Excerpts of Award, supra note 139, 105-
108; Romak Award, supra note 121, 229-230 (emphasis added).
172 Alps Finance Award, supra note 22, 241.




contribution they entailed. The tribunal in Pogtovd Banka modified the
"contribution" criterion to require not just a "contribution" but a
contribution to "an economic operation creating value." 174 Romak
similarly required a contribution to an economic "venture.
175
c) Duration: Four decisions distinguished between commercial
and investment transactions based on the "duration" each entails. The
tribunal in Joy Mining held that duration criterion was not satisfied, even
where the contractual obligations extended for over ten years, because
the price of the contract was to be fully paid at an early stage.176 The
tribunal in Romak held that a five-month span of wheat deliveries did
not satisfy the "duration" requirement, as it did "not reflect a
commitment on the part of Romak beyond a one-off transaction."177 The
claimant in Malaysian Historical Salvors did not meet the duration
criterion, apparently because the duration was not fixed and depended
upon chance.178 The tribunal in Alps Finance found that the requisite
duration was not met because the underlying contract did not have "an
ongoing duration," but rather "exhaust[ed] its object and purpose...
immediately."17 9
While the above factors are based upon the Salini test, it is the negative
definition of "investment," and not the Salini test, that is driving the analysis and
results. This is evident for two reasons. First, nothing on the face of the Salini
test justifies the. exclusion of so-called commercial transactions. The
quintessential commercial transaction-a one-off sale of goods--exhibits all of
the Salini test's core criteria. A sale of goods involves: (i) a "contribution" (by
way of either money from the buyer or goods from the seller) or "commitment"
(by way of contract); (ii) "duration" (of the negotiation and performance of a
contract); (iii) "risk" (of breach or of monetary losses from the underlying
endeavor); and (iv) an expectation of "profits" (otherwise why enter into the
transaction?). 180 Such transactions also (v) contribute to economic development
by shifting resources from those who value them less to those who value them
more. 181
Second, to the extent the above-described awards invoke the Salini test
or its factors, they apply a version of the test that is reverse-engineered for the
purpose of distinguishing commercial transactions from investments. As noted,
the awards required not just "risk" but "operational risk;" not just a
"contribution" but a "contribution to an economic venture;" and not just
7 Pogtovd Banka Award, supra note 86, 361 (emphasis added).
'"Romak Award, supra note 121, 222 (emphasis added).
176 Joy Mining Jurisdiction, supra note 103, 57.
7 Romak Award, supra note 121, 227.
1"Malaysian Historical Salvors Award, supra note 113, IM 110-11.
17' Alps Finance Award, supra note 22, 232.
"80 They may or may not involve regular profits, depending on how the transaction is structured.
... See infra Section IV.C. I.
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"duration" but a duration "beyond a one-off transaction" 182 that is not
characterized by an upfront payment 183 or that is fixed. 184 At least one of these
modifications was made for the express purpose of distinguishing commercial
transactions from investments. As Romak stated with respect to general risk: "All
economic activity entails a certain degree of risk... It is therefore not an element
that is useful for the purpose of distinguishing between an investment and a
commercial transaction." 185 These modifications are further evidence that the
Salini test itself does not require the exclusion of commercial transactions and
was not the motivating principle behind these awards. If it did, and if it was,
tribunals would not have needed to modify it to achieve that result.
3. "Commercial Transactions" are not Restricted to Sales
of Goods
Third, the awards demonstrate that when the above factors are applied,
they exclude transactions far broader than a simple sale of goods. Several of the
eight claims discussed above did not involve the sale of goods at all but were
still dismissed on the basis that the underlying transactions were fundamentally
"commercial" in nature.
a) In Joy Mining, the tribunal rejected jurisdiction on the basis that
a long-term contract to engineer, deliver and support mining equipment
was a commercial transaction, although the transaction included
engineering and technical support services.
b) In Malaysian Historical Salvors, the tribunal similarly rejected
jurisdiction on the basis that the salvage contract was merely a
commercial transaction, despite the fact that it did not involve the sale
of goods at all but was rather for services to be performed within the
host State's territory.
c) In Pogtovd Banka, the tribunal rejected jurisdiction over Greek
sovereign bonds on the basis that those bonds amounted to a mere
commercial exchange, akin to the sale of goods, although the bonds
were financial instruments.
We can thus describe the commercial transaction test as follows: It is a
jurisdictional test that (i) applies the negative definition of "investment"
("investment" does not mean "ordinary commercial transactions"), (ii) by
ascribing certain positive attributes to investments, including "value creation,"
182 Romak Award, supra note 121, 227.
i83 Joy Mining Jurisdiction, supra note 103, 57.
'4 Malaysian Historical Salvors Award, supra note 113, IM 110-11.
.85 Romak Award, supra note 121, M 229-30.
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"operational risk" and certain "duration" characteristics, (iii) which in practice
exclude transactions broader than a simple sale of goods.
C. The Impact of the Commercial Transaction Test
The commercial transaction test has been a driving force behind awards
dismissing jurisdiction on Article 25 "investment" grounds. As shown above,
eight of eleven negative jurisdictional awards were motivated by the
"commercial" nature of the underlying transaction, 186 while only one was
motivated by a neutral application of the Salini test. 187
That the Salini test would have a limited impact absent another driving
principle such as the investment-commerce distinction is not surprising in light
of how malleable it is. As discussed above, a liberal but still neutral interpretation
of the Salini test would encompass a wide range of economic activity, including
simple sales of goods. It is thus not surprising that absent some other outside
186 See supra Section f.A.
187 As discussed above, I do not count awards dismissing jurisdiction on grounds that the claimant
lacked a sufficient relationship to the investment, because whether a claimant owns an investment and is
therefore a protected investor is a different question than whether the asset or transaction at issue is in
and of itself an investment. See supra note 99. Nevertheless, six awards dismissing jurisdiction on such
grounds reference the contribution element of the Salini test. See Capital Finance Holdings Luxembourg
S.A. v. Republique du Cameroun, ICSID Case No. ARB/1 5/18, Award, 366, 455-457 (June 22, 2017)
(finding that the claimant, a Luxembourg holding company, was used to gain treaty protection for the
purchase of bank shares by a Cameroun national and thus constituted an abuse of rights; finding also
that the circularity of the transaction mean that the claimant made no contribution and thus did not make
an investment); Socidtd Civile Immobiliere de Gaeta v. Republique de Guinee, ICSID Case No.
ARB/12/36, Award, IM 253, 269, 273, 274 (Dec. 21, 2015) (finding that while a construction contract
constituted an investment pursuant to ICSID Convention Article 25, the claimant made no contribution
to it and therefore could not be considered an investor in the project); KT Asia Investment Group B.V.
v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/8, Award, 204, 206, 219 (Oct. 17, 2013)
(rejecting jurisdiction over shares in a Kazakh bank on the basis that the shell company claimant was not
the beneficial owner of the shares; the beneficial owner remained the same despite the share transfer to
the claimant, and no cash was exchanged between the buyer and seller; therefore, the shell company
claimant made no contribution and incurred no risk when acquiring the shares); Quiborax Jurisdiction,
supra note 83, I 223, 237 (finding that while shareholding in a mining venture constituted an
investment, those same shares did not constitute an investment where they were simply received as part
of a legal formality, as was the case with respect to one of the claimants in the arbitration); Caratube
International Oil Company LLP v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/12, Award, M
310-471, 409 (June 5, 2012) (answering "the question whether CIOC is an investment of Devincci
Hourani" by "first enquir[ing] whether Devincci Hourani made any contribution and took any risk," and
finding that where the claimant only made a nominal contribution for the shares, he did not make an
investment); Saba Fakes Award, supra note 4, 347 (the "'arrangement' [was] never intended to give
effect [and] did not transfer even the legal ownership of the share certificates... to Mr. Fakes. As a
result,. . . [the] arrangement does not meet the requirement of a contribution.. . , nor the requirements
of duration and risk, since no rights were actually transferred to the Claimant .... In other words, Mr.
Fakes has not made any investment in Telsim which would satisfy any of the three criteria for an
investment to exist within the meaning of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention.").
For the reasons described in supra note 99, I do not consider it appropriate to count these
cases in my analysis; their outcome turned upon the claimants' relationships to it the asset or transaction
at issue, not the nature of the asset or transaction itself. However, even if these six awards were counted,
such that a total of seven negative awards were justified on the basis of the Salini test and eight based on
the commercial transaction test, that would not change my general conclusion that the commercial
transaction test has been a driving force behind the awards dismissing jurisdiction on Article 25
"investment" grounds.
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limit or organizing principle the Salini test does not result in the denial of
jurisdiction of an outsized number of claims. 188
This is not to say the Salini test is irrelevant. It remains highly relevant
in the sense that the "prevailing" positive definition of "investment" is flexible
and unrestrictive. In practical terms, however, this flexibility means that its
impact as an objective definition of "investment" is limited. If all or nearly all
claims pass the Salini test, there is little practical difference between applying
the Salini test and applying a purely subjective interpretation of Article 25
"investment." In other words, the Salini test, on its own, has little bite. The same
is not true, however, of the negative definition of "investment."
The actual impact of the commercial transaction test may in fact be
greater than observed in terms of published awards. ICSID's Secretary General
retains the prerogative to refuse the registration of claims that it determines
"manifestly could not be considered as an investment."'1 89 While claimants have
voluntarily withdrawn their claims after being informed by the Secretariat of an
impending rejection, 19° and the substance of those claims is unknown, the one
claim known to be rejected was rejected because it arose from "a simple sale" of
goods.191
Furthermore, the influence of the commercial transaction test is
apparent not just from the number of negative jurisdictional awards it has
motivated, but also from its application in non-ICSID arbitrations. As discussed
above, because non-ICSID investment arbitrations are not subject to ICSID's
Article 25's jurisdictional requirements, the only definition of "investment" that
a transaction must satisfy is the subjective definition contained within the
consent document. In both Romak and Alps Finance, the underlying contracts at
issue fit comfortably within the applicable subjective definitions, which defined
"investment" as "every kind of asset[]" including "claims to money or to any
performance having an economic value" (Romak'92) and "every kind of asset[]"
"8 At the same time, it is possible that the Salini test has been impactful in other ways not reflected by
the number of negative jurisdictional awards it has produced. For example, it is possible that the Salini
test has narrowed the types of claims that are brought before ICSID tribunals on the front end, thus
reducing the need for awards dismissing such claims on the back end. But that seems unlikely for two
reasons. First, because it is so elastic and subject to a wide degree of tribunal discretion, its power as a
pre-emptive deterrent against non-investment claims should be weak. In light of its elasticity, we would
expect claimants to test its boundaries rather than refrain from filing claims. Second, if Salini were in
fact acting endogenously, we would expect to see at least some outward manifestation of that. Indeed,
before it could act as a pre-emptive deterrent against non-investment claims, some body of awards
dismissing claims on Salini grounds would be required. Moreover, in light of the nature of investor-
State arbitration, we would expect that body of awards to be substantial before it would begin to have a
deterrent effect against future claims. Instead, what we see is that a neutral application of the Salini test
has played a role in only a small number of awards (one of eleven) dismissing jurisdiction.
189 Shihata & Parra, supra note 90, at 308.
190 Id
191 Id.
192 See Romak Award, supra note 121, 174 (quoting Swiss Confederation and the Republic of




including "claims and rights to any performance having an economic value"
(Alps Finance 193 ). Both tribunals nevertheless rejected jurisdiction on the
grounds that the contracts were fundamentally commercial in nature and thus did
not satisfy an objective definition of "investment." That non-ICSID tribunals
have begun to apply the commercial transaction test indicates the extent to which
it has become not just a dominant definition of "investment" in ICSID
arbitration, but influential in international investment law more generally.
IV. THE FLAWS OF THE COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION TEST
In spite of its impact and influence, there has been remarkably little
critical analysis of the investment-commerce distinction or the commercial
transaction test that implements it. 194 This is particularly surprising because both
the distinction and the test are fundamentally flawed-historically, as a matter
of interpretation, conceptually, and in practice.
A. The Commercial Transaction Test is Flawed as a Matter of
Interpretation
1. The "Fundamental Assumption" Behind the
Commercial Transaction Test is Historically Wrong
As a historical matter, the test's fundamental premise-that the
Convention's drafters assumed that ordinary commercial transactions would not
be covered by the Centre's jurisdiction 195 -is wrong. As Mortenson has shown,
the exclusion of commercial transactions from ICSID jurisdiction "is
incompatible with the historical course of negotiations.
1 96
The negotiating history shows that the Convention's drafters
purposefully decided against including any definition of the term
"investment"-positive or. negative. 197 The history further shows that the
drafters actively considered definitions of "investment" that included the sale of
goods. Those included a proposal from Spain that the term "investment"
encompass "money, capital goods and other goods required for the industrial
193 Alps Finance Award, supra note 22, 230 (quoting the Agreement Between the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic and the Swiss Confederation on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments art. 1, Oct. 5, 1990, art. 1 [Treaty available at Czech Republic - Slovakia BIT (1992),
INVESTMENT POL'Y HUB, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-
agreements/treaties/bit/1227/czech-republic---slovakia-bit-1992 (last visited Nov. 17, 2019)]).
194 The most incisive analysis of the investment-commerce distinction has focused on the negotiating
history of the Convention. See Mortenson, supra note 22. Other commentators have addressed it only in
passing. See, e.g., Georges Delaume, ICSID and the Transnational Financial Community, 1 FOREIGN
INVESTMENT L.J. 2, 242 (1986) (remarking that the supply of services is "sometimes on the borderline
between investment proper and commercial transactions, which would fall outside the scope of ICSID");
Paul Szasz, A Practical Guide to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 1 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 1, 15 (1968) (unclear whether ICSID jurisdiction encompasses sales contracts).
'9' See, e.g., SCHREUER I, supra note 17, art. 25, 122.
196 See Mortenson, supra note 22, at 298.
197 See supra Section .B.
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development of a country," and from Tunisia that it "comprise[] all categories of
goods."198 These proposals were, of course, rejected with all of the rest. But their
tabling further dispels the myth that the drafters proceeded with the universal
assumption that such transactions would not be covered by the Centre.
The lack of historical basis for the commercial transaction test is
particularly relevant because its premise is so deeply rooted in the presumed
intent of the Convention's drafters. Schreuer, reciting the conventional wisdom,
has written that "it was always clear [to the Convention's drafters] that ordinary
commercial transactions would not be covered by the Centre's jurisdiction no
matter how far-reaching the parties' consent might be." 199 Likewise, the
Annulment Committee in Malaysian Historical Salvors credited the drafters'
"fundamental assumption that the term 'investment' does not mean 'sale [or 'like
transient commercial transactions']." 200 Remarkably, however, the
commentators and tribunals crediting, relying on, and perpetuating this
"fundamental assumption" do not cite to any specific documents in the
negotiating history of the Convention that support it.
20 1
The closest approximation to support of the "fundamental assumption"
is a citation to comments by Aaron Broches, the then General Counsel of the
World Bank. During the negotiation, Broches noted that it was "generally
understood that the scope of the Convention should be limited to legal disputes
as distinguished from political or commercial disputes." 20 2 In his dissent in
Abaclat v. Argentina, Professor Abi-Saab argued that the statement is evidence
that the investment-commerce distinction was "clearly on the mind of the
drafters of the Convention, particularly its main architect, A. Broches."
203
Broches' comment, however, does not evidence an intent to exclude
commercial transactions from ICSID jurisdiction. At most, it is evidence of an
intent to exclude commercial disputes, which as discussed below, are not
equivalent to or co-extensive with commercial transactions. 20 4 In any event, the
comment was controversial, Broches later expressed regret at having made it,
205
198 11-2 HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN
STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES 705, 844 (1968).
199 SCHREUER 11, supra note 17, art. 25, 122.
200 Malaysian Historical Salvors Annulment, supra note 16, IN 69,72.
201 See SCHREUER 11, supra note 17, art. 25, 122; id., 69,72; Schwebel, supra note 20, at 59-60;
Shihata & Parra, supra note 90, at 308.
202 11-1 HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN
STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES 83 (1968). See also id. at 149 ("No detailed definition of the
category of disputes in respect of which the facilities of the Center would be available has been included
in the Convention. Instead, the general understanding reflected in the Preamble, the use of the term
'investment dispute', and the requirement that the dispute be of a legal character as distinct from
political, economic or purely commercial disputes, were thought to limit the scope of the Convention in
this regard."); id. at 203 (same).
203 Abaclat Dissent on Jurisdiction, supra note 58, 45, n. 7.
204 See infra, Section V.B.
205 ARON Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, in SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 188, 208 (1995). ("The term 'dispute of a legal character'
[Vol. 45: 1
2020] Investment Misconceived
and it was rejected at least in part because of skepticism that "it was really
possible to distinguish between ... commercial disputes on the one hand, and
legal disputes on the other. 20
6
2. The Commercial Transaction Test is Flawed as a
Matter of Textual Interpretation
The commercial transaction test is also flawed as a matter of textual
interpretation. As an initial matter, it is flawed as a matter of interpretation
because it attempts to define one undefined term by another undefined term. As
a comment to the Additional Facility Rules points out, the term "ordinary
commercial transaction . . . is not defined, and hardly capable of precise
definition. .. 207 Defining "investment" by reference to another undefined term
confuses rather than clarifies. 208
Moreover, nothing in the ordinary meaning of "investment" excludes
commercial transactions, or their quintessential manifestation, the sale of
goods. 209 The Annulment Committee in Malaysian Historical Salvors,
was used in the Preliminary Draft submitted to the regional consultative meetings. The term was not
defined, but in a comment to the Draft, a distinction was made between 'disputes of a legal character'
and 'political, economic or purely commercial disputes.' Having drafted this comment myself, I have no
difficulty in calling it unfortunate, since the latter class of dispute may well involve legal issues.").
206 See Mortenson, supra note 22, at 298-299. See also id. ("This focus on the commercial nature of an
activity is incompatible with the historical course of negotiations. The World Bank's first circulated
draft suggested ruling out 'political, economic or purely commercial disputes' - caveats that were
clearly of concern to some of the leaders of the project, including Broches himself. But when the draft
was released to member nations, there was substantial resistance to the idea of excluding 'commercial'
disputes - both among countries who opposed any limitation on investment and among countries who
supported a narrower definition. The basic concern was that any such limitation would turn into a
slippery slope excluding all economic activity; even the minimalist Indian delegate expressed skepticism
that 'it was really possible to distinguish between... commercial disputes and investment activity that
would otherwise come within the Centre's purview. As a result, all efforts to preclude jurisdiction over
'merely commercial' activity were dropped."). See also H HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION ON THE
SETrLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES 493
(1968) (The delegate from India "was not sure - as seemed to be implied in paragraph of the Comment
- that it was really possible to distinguish between political, economic and commercial disputes on the
one hand, and legal disputes on the other, since each of the former categories of disputes might in fact
have a legal basis. Nor would it be very helpful to try to cover only disputes which were 'purely
legal."').
207 Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (Additional Facility Rules), ICSID,
art. 4, cmt. iii (1978) [hereinafter Comment to Additional Facility Rules],
http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/comarb/icsid/icsid3.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2019).
20 In fact, just as tribunals have invoked "ordinary commercial transactions" in order to define what
"investment" is not, the commentary to the Additional Facility Rules invokes concepts of investment to
define what "ordinary commercial transactions" arc not. See id. ("Economic transactions which may or
may not, depending on their terms, be regarded by the parties as investments for the purposes of the
Convention, which (b) involve long-term relationships or the commitment of substantial resources on
the part of either party, and which (c) are of special importance to the economy of the State party, can be
clearly distinguished from ordinary commercial transactions."). The circular references between these
definitions of "investment" and "commercial transactions" only underscore the futility of using either to
define the other.
209 As noted above, nothing on the face of the Salini test requires the exclusion of commercial
transactions either. As discussed above, commercial transactions, including one-off sales, exhibit all of
the Salini test's criteria. See supra Section IH.B.2.
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consistent with basic dictionary definitions,21 ° described the "ordinary meaning"
of "investment" as containing three elements: (i) "the commitment" (ii) "of
money or other assets" (iii) "for the purpose of providing a return., 2 1 1 The sale
of goods, from the perspective of the seller, satisfies this ordinary meaning. From
the pergpective of the seller, goods in a simple sale transaction are (i) "assets"
that are (ii) "commit[ted]" via a contract (iii) "for the purpose of providing a
return." From the perspective of the buyer, a purchase contract may also
represent an investment, if, for example, the goods are purchased for the purpose
of re-selling them (either combined with other inputs or "as is") for profit. In that
case, the buyer (i) "commits" via a contract (ii) "assets," in the form of money
or otherwise, (iii) to obtain the goods "for the purpose of providing a return."212
Interpreting Article 25 "investment" broadly and as inclusive of such
transactions is consistent with the object and purpose of the ICSID Convention
and its negotiating history. The stated purpose of the Convention is "to provide
facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between
Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States in accordance with
the provisions of this Convention." 213 Nothing in that stated purpose
recommends a restrictive interpretation of "investment." 214 To the contrary, as
discussed above, the Preamble, Article 25 and the negotiating history of the
Convention all strongly suggest that, in light of the additional "consent in
writing" jurisdictional requirement, the term "investment" should be interpreted
broadly.2 15
3. Subsequent Practice is Mixed
The best defense for the commercial transaction test may lie in
subsequent practice, though even subsequent practice is mixed on the question.
On the one hand, as noted above, there is near universal agreement
among tribunals and commentators that the term "investment" does not
210 See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2009) (investment is "[a]n expenditure to acquire
property or assets to produce revenue; a capital outlay"); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2002) (investment is "an expenditure of money for income
or profit or to purchase something of intrinsic value: [a] capital outlay"); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000) (investment is "[p]roperty or another
possession acquired for future financial return or benefit").
211 Malaysian Historical Salvors Annulment, supra note 16, 57.
22 Moreover, even if the sale transaction is viewed in isolation from the goods being transacted, the
transaction will likely have required the (i) "commitment" of (ii) resources or "assets," including time,
to find an appropriate buyer or seller and execute the contract (iii) "for the purpose of providing a
return." See Alan Sykes, The Economic Structure of International Investment Agreements and
Implications for Treaty Interpretation and Design, 113 A.J.I.L. 482, 518 (2019).
213 ICSID Convention, supra note 10, art. 1(2).
214 See Reisman & Vinnik, supra note 9, at 69 ("ICSID is a service provider whose function has become
making available an arbitral option. If parties want this service for transactions that meet other explicit
jurisdictional tests, such as nationality, why should an ICSIID tribunal refuse them? Should not
governments be able to decide for themselves which transactions they want to encourage by promising
BIT protection?").
215 See supra Section IH.B.
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encompass "ordinary commercial transactions," or at the very least a simple sale
of goods.2 16 Further support in subsequent practice can be found in ICSID's
Additional Facility Rules, which were adopted by the ICSID Administrative
Council in 1978. The purpose of those Rules was to enable the administration of
proceedings between States and nationals of other States that fell outside the
scope of the ICSID Convention.217 Thus, Article 2(b) of the Additional Facility
Rules allows for admission of disputes that "do not arise directly out of an
investment ... , ,218 Yet the Rules also expressly condition jurisdiction on the
Secretary General's determination that the "underlying transaction has features
which distinguish it from an ordinary commercial transaction." 219
The purpose of the exclusion of "ordinary commercial transactions" was
not to clarify that such transactions did not constitute Article 25 "investments."
Indeed one of the purposes of the Additional Facility Rules was to enable the
administration of non-investment disputes. 220 Rather, the purpose of the
commercial transaction exclusion was to emphasize that the Additional Facility
was not intended to be an "alternative to existing mechanisms for the settlement
of commercial disputes," 221 nor a "mere duplication of facilities for
[commercial] dispute settlement." 22 2 A non-binding Comment to the Rules,
nevertheless, made clear that its drafters were of the mind that investments could
be "clearly distinguished from ordinary commercial transactions. '" 223
On the other hand, the subsequent practice of Contracting States
suggests that they interpret the term "investment" to include such transactions.
216 See supra Section H.D.2.
217 Comment to Additional Facility Rules, supra note 207, Introduction.
218 ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 141, art. 2(b).
219 d. art. 4(3). See also Comment to Additional Facility Rules, supra note 207, Introduction (describing
the expansion ofjurisdiction to "disputes that do not arise directly out of an investment, provided that
the underlying transaction is not an ordinary commercial transaction").
220 See Comment to Additional Facility Rules, supra note 207, Introduction, art. 4, cmt. iv.
221 Id. art. 4, cmt. i.
222 ICSID, ICSID TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT 1977/78 3 (1978).
223 Comment to Additional Facility Rules, supra note 207, art. 4, cmt. iii ("Economic transactions
which, may or may not, depending on their terms, be regarded by the parties as investments for the
purposes of the Convention, which (b) involve long-term relationships or the commitment of substantial
resources on the part of either party, and which (c) are of special importance to the economy of the State
party, can be clearly distinguished from ordinary commercial transactions."). This comment and the
Rules more generally fall short of "agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions" or "subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation" pursuant to VCLT Art. 3(a) or (b).
As an initial matter, it was "clearly understood that [Additional Facility] proceedings would not be
governed by the Convention but would be based solely on contract." ICSID Twelfth Annual Report
1977/78, supra note 222, at 3. The exclusion of "ordinary commercial transactions" thus did not
necessarily reflect the Council's views as to the Convention's mandates, but rather as to what was
appropriate for non-Convention arbitrations. Second, because the Administrative Council is able to
approve resolutions, including the Additional Facility Rules, by a mere majority of two-thirds of the
members of the Administrative Council, the Council resolutions do not necessarily reflect "an
agreement" between all of the parties to the Convention. See ICSID Convention, supra note 10, art.
6(1). Finally, the comment accompanying the Additional Facility Rules that investments could be
"clearly distinguished from ordinary commercial transactions," was "non-binding" and not part of the
Rules. See ICSID, ICSID Additional Facility Rules,
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Most BITs consenting to ICSID arbitration define "investment" in a way that
comfortably encompasses so-called "ordinary commercial transactions,"
including a simple sale of goods. According to the tribunal in Fedax:
A broad definition of investment... is not at all an exceptional
situation. On the contrary, most contemporary bilateral treaties
of this kind refer to 'every kind of asset' or to 'all assets',
including the listing of examples that can qualify for coverage;
claims to money and to any performance having a financial
value are prominent features of such listings.
2 24
Simple sales of goods may constitute investments under such widely
adopted definitions, as a "kind of asset" or a "claim to money" or "performance."
In fact, "only exceptionally has a treaty excluded claims to money that arise
solely from commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services from the
definition of investment .... 225 While not conclusive of the meaning of Article
25 "investment," 226 these bilateral definitions are "a strong indication that [the
parties] consider their transaction an investment," 227 and that the term
"investment" in the investor-State arbitration context does not inherently exclude
such transactions.
B. The Commercial Transaction Test is Flawed in Concept
In addition to the lack of support in the text and historical record of the
ICSIID Convention, the putative distinction between commercial and investment
transactions suffers from fundamental conceptual flaws. There is simply no clear
and principled line to be drawn between commercial and investment activities.
As international commercial law demonstrates, investment transactions, far from
being distinct from commercial transactions, are in fact a type of commercial
transaction. And as economic principles show, even the quintessential
commercial transaction-the sale of goods-may constitute an investment. In
other words, the concepts are inherently linked and intertwined, and the notion
that a sale or "ordinary commercial transaction "manifestly could not be
considered an investment" 228 is fundamentally misconceived.
1. Economic Principles
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/ICSID-Additinal-Faciity-Rutes.aspx (last visited Nov.
17, 2019).
224 Fedax Jurisdiction, supra note 48, 34 (citing Antonio R. Parra, The Scope of New Investment Laws
and International Instruments, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE LAW 27,
35-36 (Robert Pritchard ed., 1996)).
225 SGS v. Pakistan Jurisdiction, supra note 94, 133, n. 153.
226 See supra Section II.C.
227 SCHREUER II, supra note 17, art. 25, 129.
228 Shihata & Parra, supra note 90, at 308.
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The economic concept of investment is instructive in light of its
influence on other interpretations of "investment," including the Salini test,22 9
and in light of the Convention's express reference to "economic development,
and the role of private international investment therein. 230
Economic principles do not distinguish between commercial and
investment activities. Instead, macroeconomic theory categorizes economic
output into two buckets: output destined for consumption and output destined for
savings and investment.231 Consumption is composed of all of the new products
and services purchased by individuals or households for their own personal use,
including durable goods (such as refrigerators and cars) and non-durable goods
(such as food and clothing).232 Investment, on the other hand, is composed of
purchases of goods for future use, 23 3 or the purchases of "any asset that will
produce value in the future. 234 Macroeconomic theory thus defines investment
according to whether a good or service is for end-use (consumption) or for future
use (investment). 5
Pursuant to basic macroeconomic models, even a simple sale of goods-
the quintessential commercial transaction-may constitute an investment.
Investment spending in macroeconomic models of GDP includes spending on
business fixed investment as well as spending on inventory.2 36 Business fixed
investment consists of capital such as machinery, factories, and other long-term
assets that are used in the production process.237 Inventory, on the other hand,
includes stocks of inputs (such as raw materials) and final goods ready for sale
229 Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 15, at 98.
230 ICSID Convention, supra note 10, pmbl. The economic concept of investment, and more specifically
the macroeconomic concept of investment, is thus more relevant in investor-State arbitration than other
applications of the term in the context of accounting or securities regulation. For example, in the context
of securities regulation, the United States Supreme Court has defined an investment contract as "a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to
expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party." SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293, 298-299 (1946). This securities-focused definition is not appropriate in the investor-State
context as it would, inter alia, effectively exclude foreign direct investments, in which actors expect
profits from their own efforts, not "solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party." Moreover,
from the perspective of the real economy, financial instruments such as stocks and bonds do not
represent "investments" at all "because they don't represent either the production or the sale of final
goods and services" but "[r]ather... a promise to pay with interest [or] proof of ownership." PAUL
KRUGMAN & ROBIN WELLS, MACROECONOMICS 194 (3d ed., 2013).
231 See, e.g., Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory ofEconomic Growth, 70 QUARTERLY J.
ECON. 66 (Feb. 1956) ("Part of... output is consumed and the rest is saved and invested.").232 N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS 25 (5th ed., 2003).
233 Id. ("Investment consists of goods bought for future use. Investment is also divided into three
subcategories: business fixed investment, residential fixed investment, and inventory investment.
Business fixed investment is the purchase of new plant and equipment by firms. Residential investment
is the purchase of new housing by households and landlords. Inventory investment is the increase in
firms' inventories of goods (if inventories are falling, inventory investment is negative).").
234 Moselle, supra note 1, at 12 (emphasis removed).
233 Id. at 10. Investment, in other words, "involves giving up something at one point in time in order to
get something back at a later point in time." Id.
236 See, e.g., KRUGMAN & WELLS supra note 230, at 190; MANKIW, supra note 232, at 25.
237 MANKIw, supra note 232, at 25.
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that firms maintain to facilitate business. 2 3 8 Such goods are considered an
investment according to macroeconomic theory because "like a machine,
additional inventory is an investment in future sales."
2 39
Thus, before a sale, goods in a so-called simple sale may constitute an
investment in the form of inventory to the seller. After a sale, they may constitute
an investment to the buyer if the goods are purchased for the purpose of using
them as inputs in another process or simply for reselling. Until they are resold,
either having been combined with other goods in a production process or alone,
such goods would constitute an investment in the form of unsold inventory.24°
2. Intemational Commercial Law
While economic principles recognize that even quintessential
commercial transactions, such as the sale of goods, may constitute investments,
international commercial law recognizes that investments constitute commercial
activities.241 The international commercial arbitration regime is instructive, as
the field has developed a sophisticated understanding of what constitutes a
commercial activity, and because tribunals have referenced potential conflict
with that regime as a reason to reject jurisdiction over commercial
242transactions.
The New York Convention allows members to declare that the
Convention applies only to "relationships.. .which are considered commercial
under the national law of the State making [the] declaration." 243 In general,
national courts in States which have made such a declaration, including the
United States, have defined commercial relationships "extremely" broadly,244
including relationships arising from an investment. In fact, investment treaty
awards have been enforced pursuant to the New York Convention in the United
238 KRUGMAN & WELLS supra note 230, at 190 ("Inventories are stocks of goods and raw materials held
to facilitate business operations.").
3 Id. at 194; see also MANKiw, supra note 232, at 462.
240 This basic economic logic applies to both domestically and foreign produced goods. Thus, unsold
imported goods located in the territory of a host State may reasonably be considered investments from
the perspective of the exporter until the sale is consummated. Once the sale is consummated, they may
be considered investments from the perspective of the importer. This is fully consistent with
macroeconomic theory, which counts goods imported for business use as investment in the GDP
accounting formula. Scott A. Wolla, How do Imports Affect GDP, FED RESERVE BANK ST. LOUIS (Sept.
2018), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/page I-econ/2018/09/04/how-do-imports-affect-gdp.
241 Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT requires to be "taken into account.. .any relevant rules of international
law applicable in the relations between the parties." VCLT, supra note 55. Whether or not international
commercial arbitration law is relevant and applicable here and thus must be taken into account is up for
debate; regardless, it is informative for the particular discussion.
242 See infra note 336 & accompanying text.
243 New York Convention, supra note 28, art. 1(3).
244 GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: VOLUME I- INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 299-300 (2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter BORN ICA Vol. I]. U.S. courts, for
example, have found that the term "commercial" is broader than that of "commerce" and includes not
just a sale of goods between corporations, but also employee-employer relations, consumer transactions,




States, where the Convention is limited to "commercial relationships." 245 The
disputes arising from those investments were found to arise from a "commercial"
relationship between the host State and investor.246
Likewise, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, which has been adopted by sixty States, and whose application is
limited to "international commercial arbitration," 247 suggests that commercial
activities are inclusive of investment activities. A footnote to the Model Law
States:
The term 'commercial' should be given a wide interpretation so as to
cover matters arising from all relationships of a commercial nature,
whether contractual or not. Relationships of a commercial nature
include, but are not limited to . . . investment; financing; banking;
insurance; exploitation agreement or concession .... 248
This is consistent with the leading commentator's understanding of
''commercial," as a term that refers to a "relationship involving economic
exchange where one (or both) parties contemplate realizing a profit or other
benefit," which should be interpreted "liberal[ly]" and "expansive ly]" to
"include[] all manner of business, financial, consulting, investment, technical
and other enterprise." 249
International commercial law thus categorizes investment as a type of
commercial activity. It suggests that there is no line between investment and
commercial activities, just between commercial activities that are investments
and commercial activities that are not investments. This overlap between
commercial and investment transactions is likely what has led tribunals and
commentators to qualify that Article 25 does not extend to "mere commercial
transactions" 250 or "ordinary commercial transactions." 251 The qualifications
"mere" and "ordinary" can be understood as referring to commercial transactions
that are not also investments. But this is just another way of saying that
"investments" are not "commercial transactions that are not investments." It is a
243 See, e.g., Chevron Corp., supra note 39, at 57 (confirming an investor-State arbitration award issued
against Ecuador pursuant to the New York Convention).
246 The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods does not define "commerce."
Rather, its application is limited to "contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business
are in different States." United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
art.l(I), Apr. 10, 1980, S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG].
247 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration (1985 with amendments as adopted in 2006), art. 1(1), United Nations
documents A/40/17, annex I and A/61/17, annex I, [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law]. While the
footnote was not formally included in the Model Law text, it "nonetheless represents authoritative
guidance as to the intended scope of the term 'commercial' and has been expressly adopted by several
States in their commercial arbitration laws. BORN ICA Vol. I, supra note 244, at 308.
24 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 247, art. 1(1), n. 2 (emphasis added).
249 BORN ICA Vol. I, supra note 244, at 304.
250 Alps Finance Award, supra note 22, 105.
251 SCHREUER II, supra note 17, art. 25, 122 (emphasis added).
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tautology that simply returns us to the question of what an "investment" is in the
first place.
C. The Commercial Transaction Test is Flawed in Practice
Further evidence of the lack of a principled and predictable division
between commercial and investment transactions can be found in tribunals'
attempts to draw one. As discussed above, tribunals have attempted to
distinguish between commercial and investment activities by ascribing certain
positive characteristics to investments that are not found in other commercial
transactions. According to this test, an "investment," as opposed to a "mere
commercial transaction," entails the presence of: (i) a contribution to a "value-
creating economic operation"; (ii) "operational risk"; and (iii) certain durational
requirements. Ascribing positive attributes to investments in order to apply the
negative defmition of "investment" appears counterintuitive, but it nevertheless
makes sense when considering that investments are a type of commercial
activity. 252 In this context, distinguishing investments from other commercial
activities requires either defining "investment," "ordinary commercial
transaction" (which is "hardly capable of precise definition" 253), or every other
type of non-investment commercial activity, of which there are multitudes.254
As discussed below, however, the factors applied in this commercial
transaction test offer no principled, predictable or textually supportable basis for
distinguishing investment transactions from other commercial transactions. This
is unsurprising in light of the flaws in the test's underlying premise that "ordinary
commercial transactions," including sales of goods, cannot constitute
investments.
1. The "Value" Theory of Investment
As discussed above, two negative jurisdictional decisions attempted to
distinguish investments from commercial activities based upon the type of
contribution each entails. According to Potov6 Banka and Romak, investments
entail not just a "contribution" but a contribution to "an economic operation
252 The commentary to the Additional Facility Rules likewise regresses to circularity when attempting to
define "ordinary commercial transaction." Instead of defining the term, which as noted above, it
recognizes is "hardly capable of precise definition," it attempts to define "ordinary commercial
transactions" by what they are not. It states: "Economic transactions which (a) may or may not,
depending on their terms, be regarded by the parties as investments for the purposes of the Convention,
which (b) involve long-term relationships or the commitment of substantial resources on the part of
either party, and which (c) are of special importance to the economy of the State party, can be clearly
distinguished from ordinary commercial transactions." Comment to Additional Facility Rules, supra
note 207, art. 4, cmt. iii.
253 Id.
254 See accompanying text of supra notes 248 & 249.
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creating value"255 or "in furtherance of a venture." 256 The tribunal in Pogtov6
Banka explained its value-based theory of investments as follows:
An investment, in the economic sense, is linked with a process
of creation of value, which distinguishes it clearly from a sale,
which is a process of exchanging values or a subscription to
sovereign bonds which is also a process of exchange of values
i.e. a process of providing money for a given amount of money
in return. 257
There are, however, two fundamental flaws with this theory. First, it
ignores the value created by the exchange of goods or services in a market. When
a good is exchanged in a free market, it passes from one who values it less to one
who values it more. This efficient allocation itself creates value .2 8 Second, the
value-based theory of investment also ignores the value of goods or services
added in anticipation of the exchange, as well as their value to the buyer. In other
words, it ignores the value of the goods or services being transacted, and the
transaction's causal role in creating that value. Value creation, therefore, is not a
sound basis for distinguishing between sales of goods and investment
transactions. Value is created by both.
Proponents of the value-based theory of investment might concede that
exchanges create value, but still attempt to differentiate investments from the
sale of goods on the basis that investments continue to create value after and in
addition to the sale. They might have in mind, for instance, capital investments
such as factories and machinery, and the value those investments create after the
sale in the production process. 259 It is possible that production, not value
creation, was the concept that the Pogtov6 Banka tribunal had in mind.
As an initial matter, it bears emphasis that interpreting Article 25 to be
limited to a specific type of investment-capital investment or business fixed
255 Pogtovd Banka Award, supra note 86, 361 (emphasis added).
256 Romak Award, supra note 121, 222 (emphasis added).
257 Po~tovi Banka Award, supra note 86, 361.
258 This value is created regardless of whether a good is exchanged on the primary market (and is thus
occasioned by new production) or the secondary market (where nothing new is produced). Cooter and
Ulen, in their textbook, Law and Economics, illustrate this principle with the following example:
Adam who lives in a small town, has a 1957 Chevy convertible in good repair. The pleasure
of owning and driving the car is worth $3000 to Adam. Blair, who has been coveting the car
for years, inherits $5000 and decides to try to buy the car from Adam. After inspecting the
car, Blair decides that the pleasure of the owning the car and driving it is worth $4000 to her
According to these facts... [the parties] can move a resource (the car) from someone who
values it less (Adam) to someone who values it more (Blair). Moving the resource in this
case from Adam, who values it at $3000, to Blair, who values it at $4000, will create $1000
in value.
COOTER AND ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 78-79 (5th ed., 2008).
259 KRUGMAN & WELLS, supra note 230, at 194.
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investment-is inconsistent with the text or negotiating history of Article 25,
which places no limits or qualifications on the term. 260 In any event, a
production-based theory would also fail to justify the exclusion of goods. "The
notion of production in economics is very broad and essentially involves any
transformation, including even the 'transformation' of goods today into the same
goods tomorrow through storage." 261 Goods may therefore contribute to
production by being combined with other goods or simply by existing from one
day to the next.26 2 For example, a sale between two firms of intermediate goods,
i.e., goods used in the production process, could fall under a production theory
of investment: the sale of such goods would occasion their own production
(before the sale) and further production of additional goods (after the sale).263
Like the value-based theory of investment, therefore, a production-based theory
of investment offers neither a principled nor textually supportable basis for the
exclusion of a sale of goods from the defmition of "investment."
2. The "Operational Risk" Theory of Investment
As discussed above, six awards attempted to distinguish investments
from commercial transactions based upon the nature of the risk each entails.
According to the tribunals in Romak and Potovd Banka, investments necessarily
entail "operational" or "investment" risk, which is distinguishable from other
types of economic risk.264 The Romak tribunal explained this theory as follows:
All economic activity entails a certain degree of risk. As such,
all contracts-including contracts that do not constitute an
investment-carry the risk of non-performance. However, this
kind of risk is pure commercial, counterparty risk, or, otherwise
26 See supra Section I.B.
261 Moselle, supra note 1, at 13. See also GERARD DEBREu, THEORY OF VALUE 35, n. 1 (1959) ("The
idea that a good or a service available at a certain date (and a certain location) is a different commodity
from the same good or service available at a different date (or a different location) is old.").
262 Moreover, determining what assets are part of the production process would present practical
difficulty; assets have "always played a dual role, as both a store of value and a factor of production."
See THOMAS PIKEThFY, CAPITAL IN THE TwENTY-FRST CENTURY 48 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014)
(citing gold as an example of a capital asset that may act as a store of value as well as "a factor of
production, not only in the manufacture ofjewelry but also in electronics and nano-technology"). Not all
exchanges involve production. For example, the exchange of used goods on the secondary market does
not involve new production. But a production-based theory of investment would also fail to exclude the
types of transactions that Poftovd Banka intended to exclude. A true production-based theory of
investment, while excluding secondary sales of used goods, would actually include goods produced in
anticipation of a sale, i.e., new goods.
263 The distinguishing feature between capital investments and intermediate goods used in the
production process is the durability and sunk costs of the former. Capital investments are not tied
closely to current production; rather they involve an outlay that which is only recouped over time.
Intermediate goods, on the other hand, are used up in production. The cost of their purchase is generally
recouped upon sale of the product into which they have been incorporated or transformed. Even from a
policy perspective, it is unclear why low sunk-costs should be a basis for restricting ICSID jurisdiction.
While it is true that lower sunk costs should reduce the sovereign risk associated with an asset, that
lower risk should lead to fewer ICSID claims independent of any jurisdictional bar. See infra Section
V.A.
264 Romak Award, supra note 121, 229-30; Pogtovd Banka Award, supra note 86, IM 368-69.
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stated, the risk of doing business generally. It is therefore not
an element that is useful for the purpose of distinguishing
between an investment and a commercial transaction.
An 'investment risk' entails a different kind of alea, a situation
in which the investor cannot be sure of a return on his
investment, and may not know the amount he will end up
spending, even if all relevant counterparties discharge their
contractual obligations. Where there is 'risk' of this sort, the
investor simply cannot predict the outcome of the
transaction.
2 65
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that this expressly teleological
theory has no apparent policy justification. It takes for granted that commercial
transactions should be excluded and seeks to identify "an element that is useful
for the purpose of distinguishing between an investment and a commercial
transaction." 266 The "value" theory arguably (though wrongly) could be justified
on policy grounds: it makes policy sense to protect (and therefore incentivize)
value-creating activities over non-value creating ones. The risk-based theory,
however, offers no such apparent policy rationale. In fact, outside of the
jurisdictional tests that apply it, the distinction between commercial and
investment risk is irrelevant in investor-State proceedings. Absent specific
provisions, 267 BITs protect against neither type of risk. An investor can neither
recover for non-performance by a contracting party (so-called "commercial
risk") nor for a money-losing enterprise (so-called "operational risk"). Rather,
investor-State arbitration is dedicated to protecting against a completely different
and unrelated type of risk: sovereign risk (i.e., the risk of State interference). 268
265 Romak Award, supra note 121, 229-30.
266 Id. 229.
267 A State may consent to ICSID arbitration of contractual disputes between itself and a foreign national
by way of a so-called umbrella clause. See, e.g., Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Switz.-Pak.,
art. 11, July 11, 1995, SR 0.975.262.3 ("Either Contracting Party shall constantly guarantee the
observance of the commitments it has entered into with respect to the investments of the investors of the
other Contracting Party.") [English translation obtained from Pakistan-Switzerland BIT (1995),
UNCTAD INVESTMENT POL'Y HUB, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-
agreements/treaties/bit/2721/pakistan---switzerland-bit-1995 (last visited Nov. 17, 2019)]. The validity
of such consent, and whether ICSID can hear purely contractual disputes is contested. Compare SGS v.
Pakistan Jurisdiction, supra note 94 (finding no jurisdiction over purely contractual claims) with SGS
Socidtd Gdndrale de Surveillance S.A v. The Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29,
Decision on Jurisdiction, (Feb. 12, 2012) [hereinafter SGS v. Paraguay Jurisdiction] (finding that it
would have jurisdiction over contractual claims). See also El Paso Energy International Co. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, 65 (Apr. 27, 2006) (rejecting
jurisdiction over purely contractual claims); L.E.S.I. Jurisdiction, supra note 83 (same).
266 See Ambiente Ufficio Jurisdiction, supra note 4, 485 ("Respondent submits that the risk assumed
by the Claimants of not being paid is not different from that involved in any commercial contract
between a creditor and a debtor and that such ordinary commercial contracts cannot be considered an
investment .... However, given the risk of the host State's sovereign intervention, a risk that became
manifest in Argentina's very default and restructuring, what is at stake is not an ordinary commercial
risk.").
2020]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
In any event, like the "value" theory of investment, the "operational
risk" theory seeks to isolate the transaction from the thing being transacted. The
theory ignores, for example, that the very "operational" risk it requires is almost
certainly present in the production or preparation of the transacted thing before
it is sold. Prior to the sale, the producer of goods may not "be sure of a return on
his investment, and may not know the amount he will end up spending, even if
all relevant counterparties discharge their contractual obligations. ' 269 The same
is true with respect to the purchaser after the sale if the purchase was made to
further a production process. The purchaser will not "be sure of a return on an
investment . . . even if all relevant counterparties discharge their contractual
obligations. '270
Applying the "operational risk" factor in a way that ignores this broader
context leads to absurd results and therefore should be rejected. For example, if
the inquiry of whether "operational risk" exists is limited to the transaction
without its broader context, then even the purchase of a factory or capital
equipment would fail to qualify as an investment. If, on the other hand, the
broader context of a transaction is taken into account, then the "operational risk"
theory does not actually provide a basis for excluding sales of goods from the
definition of "investment," for the reasons discussed above. Thus, as with the
"value" theory, a true "operational risk" theory of investment, which considers
the overall context of a transaction, encompasses the very commercial
transactions, including sales of goods, that it seeks to exclude.
3. The "Duration" Theory of Investment
Finally, as discussed above, four negative decisions distinguished
commercial transactions from investment transactions based upon the duration
each entails. It is unclear exactly what principle was applied to distinguish the
duration of investment activities from that of commercial activities. However, in
making their determination, the tribunals considered the point during the
transaction at which the claimant was paid (Joy Mining),27 ' the overall duration
of the obligations (Romak), 2 72 whether the duration was fixed or variable
(Malaysian Historical Salvors),2 73 and whether the contract had an "an ongoing
duration," or "exhaust[ed] its object and purpose . . . immediately" (Alps
Finance).274
None of these considerations offer a predictable or principled basis for
defining investment activities. It is entirely unclear why the point at which a
claimant is paid should factor into the analysis at all, particularly when the
performance of the contract continues beyond that payment. Indeed, the
269 See Romak Award, supra note 121, 230.
270 See id
271 Joy Mining Jurisdiction, supra note 103, 7 57.
272 Romak Award, supra note 121, 226-27.
273 Malaysian Historical Salvors Award, supra note 113, 77 110-11.
274 Alps Finance Award, supra note 22, T 232.
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consideration appears to contradict the very concept of investment advanced by
the tribunal that applied it. According to the tribunal in Joy Mining, the existence
of "commercial risk" (or risk of default) is inapposite as to the existence of an
investment, which is instead characterized by "operational risk. '275 Yet, upfront
payments only eliminate "commercial risk," not "operational risk." Economic
actors may lose money on transactions even when paid upfront if the cost of
subsequent performance exceeds the upfront payment.
It is further unclear why a fixed duration is more indicative of an
investment than a variable duration. A variable duration is fully consistent with
the notion of an investment as a business enterprise, which is widely accepted.276
Traditional business enterprises typically do not open their doors with the intent
to close them and withdraw from the market on a date certain.
Finally, it is entirely unclear what principled and predictable metric
could be used to determine the required duration of an investment, or even how
the duration of the transaction at issue should be calculated. With respect to the
required duration, as discussed above, tribunals have come to vastly different
and seemingly random conclusions. The Salini award, for example, noted that
according to the doctrine, the minimal duration requirement was two to five
years. 277 Why two years is sufficient, but twenty-three months is not, is unclear,
let alone how a tribunal should determine whether two, three, four or five years
should be required. The Bayinidir tribunal seemingly recognized the difficulty
of establishing a fixed metric and vaguely counseled that tribunals should not
"place the bar very high., 278 How the duration of the transaction at issue should
be calculated is equally unclear and susceptible to unpredictable divergence. For
example, tribunals have diverged as to whether the calculation of duration should
include unexpected delays, pre- or post-contract phases, and/or contract
guarantees.
279
The inherent difficulty, if not impossibility, of applying principled and
predictable standards to the question of duration makes it ill-suited for
distinguishing investments from commercial transactions. This is to say nothing
275 Joy Mining Jurisdiction, supra note 103, 57.
276 See e.g. CSOB Jurisdiction, supra note 49, 72 ("An investment is frequently a rather complex
operation, composed of various interrelated transactions, each element of which, standing alone, might
not in all cases qualify as an investment."); SCHREUER II, supra note 17, art. 25, 93 ("An investment
operation typically involves a number of ancillary transactions.").
277 Salini Jurisdiction, supra note 13, 54.
278 Bayindir Jurisdiction, supra note 82, 133.
279 Compare Joy Mining Jurisdiction, supra note 103 (finding that technical assistance and maintenance
obligations that lasted 6 months and 10 years respectively were insufficient to meet the duration
requirement) with Jan de Nul Jurisdiction, supra note 83 (finding a contract to dredge the Suez Canal
was of a sufficiently long duration because it lasted for two years, considering the pre-tender and post-
Contract execution phases).
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of how particularly inappropriate any duration requirement is in light of the
Convention drafters' express consideration and rejection of one.2
80
4. The "Operation" Theory of Investment Generally
Both explicit and implicit in the above factors is the notion that an
investment amounts, not just to an asset or sale, but to an operation or venture.
As noted above, Pogtov6 Banka and Romak required a contribution to "an
economic operation creating value"281 or "venture."282 Pogtovci Banka and Alps
Finance similarly identified the type of risk associated with an investment as
"operational risk. 283 The existence of an operation may also be the only way to
make sense of the tribunals' assessment of "duration." For example, an
enterprise-or at least a traditional long-term enterprise-would not expect to
receive a single up-front payment, but would rather expect to incur upfront sunk
costs which it would then expect to recoup later. An enterprise-or at least a
traditional brick-and-mortar enterprise-would also not expect to conduct just a
single "one-off' transaction.2 84
Together, these factors suggest that the commercial transaction test is
not just based on the negative definition of "investment" (investment does not
mean sale or like transient transaction) but also on a positive definition of
"investment" as an operation or enterprise within the host State; in other words,
a foreign direct investment ("FDI").2 85 While potentially justifiable on policy
grounds, 286 that positive definition of "investment" is effectively precluded by
the text of Article 25. Article 25 employs the word "direct[]" only once, 287 and
280 See Mortenson, supra note 22, at 298 ("The World Bank drafters' first attempt to define 'investment'
imposed a five-year minimum duration. This limitation was strongly criticized in the Legal Committee
and was dropped in the final draft after lingering debate over the issue." (internal citations omitted)).
28 PogtovA Banka Award, supra note 86, 361 (emphasis added).
282 Romak Award, supra note 121, 222 (emphasis added).
283 PogtovA Banka Award, supra note 86, 369-70 (emphasis added); Alps Finance Award, supra note
22, 241 (emphasis added).
24 See Romak Award, supra note 121, 227.
285 See, e.g., DAVID MILES & ANDREW SCOTT, MACROECONOMICS 513 (2d ed. 2015) (Foreign direct
investment ("FDP') implies "a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another economy... a long-term
relationship between the investor and the recipient firm, where the investor has a significant influence
over the enterprise."). A 10% direct shareholding is generally considered sufficient to establish a foreign
direct investment, while a lower shareholding is considered a portfolio investment. See OECD, OECD
BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 234 (4th ed. 2008),
https://www.oecd.org/investment/fdibenchmarkdefinition.htm ("Foreign direct investment (FDD is a
category of investment that reflects the objective of establishing a lasting interest by a resident
enterprise in one economy (direct investor) in an enterprise (direct investment enterprise) that is resident
in an economy other than that of the direct investor.") (emphasis in original). See id. ("The lasting
interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the direct
investment enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise. The
direct or indirect ownership of 10% or more of the voting power of an enterprise resident in one
economy by an investor resident in another economy is evidence of such a relationship."); IMF,
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANUAL 86 (1993) ("[A] direct investment enterprise is ... an incorporated or
unincorporated enterprise in which a direct investor, who is resident in another economy, owns 10
percent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power (for an incorporated enterprise) or the equivalent
(for an unincorporated enterprise).")
2'6 See infra, Section V.A.
287 ICSID Convention, supra note 10, art. 25.
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it quite clearly modifies the clause "arising out of' and not the term
"investment." As explained by the tribunal in Fedax, this textual formulation
effectively precludes interpreting Article 25 "investment" as limited to direct
investments:
[T]he text of Article 25(1) establishes that the 'jurisdiction of
the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out
of an investment.' It is apparent that the term 'directly' relates
in this Article to the 'dispute' and not to the 'investment.' It
follows that jurisdiction can exist even in respect of
investments that are not direct, so long as the dispute arises
directly from such transaction. 288
In fact, interpreting Article 25 "investment" as limited to "direct
investment" would effectively switch the placement of the term "direct" from its
original location, such that it would read as follows:
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute
arising di-eetly out of an direct investment ....
Such a reading is precluded by the plain text of the Article and therefore must be
rejected. 289 In fact, multiple tribunals have accepted jurisdiction over
investments, such as debt, that do not constitute FDI.290
5. The Resulting Uncertainty
Because the "duration," "value creation" and "operational risk" theories
of investment fail to provide a principled, predictable or textually supportable
basis for distinguishing investments from other commercial transactions, their
application in practice injects uncertainty into investor-State arbitration.
Evidence of this uncertainty can be found not only in the analysis of
those factors, as shown above, but also in other awards that examined similar
2. Fedax Jurisdiction, supra note 48, 24.
289 The object and purpose of the ICSID Convention as expressed in its Preamble also offers little
support for interpreting Article 25 "investment" as direct investment. The preamble of the ICSID
Convention expressly "consider[s] the need for international cooperation for development, and the role
of private international investment therein." There is good reason to believe that FDI contributes more to
economic development than non-direct forms investment, such as financial assets. See infra note 307 &
accompanying text. However, while the Preamble's reference to "the need for economic cooperation for
development" can be viewed as a basis for including FDI under Article 25 "investment," it cannot be
reasonably viewed as a basis for excluding other types of investment, which while potentially less
beneficial to economic development than FDI, are nonetheless still beneficial. The Preamble simply
refers to "the role of private international investment" in international development, without specifying
that such investment be direct.
290 See, e.g. Fedax Jurisdiction, supra note 48, 29 (admitting claims related to state-agency bonds);
Abaclat Jurisdiction, supra note 78, 1367 (admitting claims related to sovereign bonds); Ambiente
Ufficio Jurisdiction, supra note 4, 472 (same); Giovanni Alemanni and others v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 296 (Nov. 17, 2014)
[hereinafter Alemanni Jurisdiction] (same).
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transactions and came to diametrically opposite conclusions as to their nature as
"investments." In Jan de Nul v. Egypt, for example, the tribunal found that a
contract to dredge the Suez Canal, involving the temporary mobilization of ships,
not unlike that in Malaysian Historical Salvors, constituted an investment.29' In
GEA v. Ukraine, the tribunal found that a supply and services contract, not
dissimilar from that in Joy Mining, constituted an investment. 292 And in
diametric opposition to the award in Po~tov6 Banka,29 3 three separate tribunals
concluded that (Argentine) sovereign bonds were not mere commercial
exchanges, but were investments under Article 25.294 Jurisprudence that reaches
such disparate and apparently contradictory results is one characterized by a
high-degree of uncertainty, or as Reisman and Vinnik describe it, "so incoherent
so as to be a free choice for tribunals."295
The uncertainty and incoherence of the investment-commerce
distinction undermine the purpose of the regime, 296 which is to encourage
investment by creating credible and actionable commitments by the host State.297
Because the commercial transaction test is not "a bright line test that can be
readily understood and applied by prospective beneficiaries of the investment
treaty at the time they are deciding whether or not to commit resources to a
project in the economy of the host State," it does not serve, but instead
undermines, this object and purpose.298 Prospective investors may not invest in
States because they are unsure whether their activities will be protected, leading
to losses by both the prospective investor and the prospective host State. States,
unsure of what transactions are subject to protection, may refrain from taking
beneficial regulatory actions in order to avoid triggering borderline claims, or
may miscalculate and incur unexpected liability. 299 The uncertainty also causes
wasteful and unnecessary litigation. In the absence of a principled, predictable
and textually supportable rule, investors and States are sure to continue to
challenge tribunals' jurisdiction, further extending the duration of the arbitration
291 Jan de Nul Jurisdiction, supra note 83, 92.
292 GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award, 153 (Mar. 31,
2011) (finding that a contractual arrangement whereby the claimant supplied over one million metric
tons of diesel and naphtha, catalysts and other materials, together with "know-how on logistics,
marketing, and the mobilisation of repairs and other services" for a period of three years "was clearly a
complex relationship going far beyond a simple sale of raw materials" that constituted an Article 25
"investment").
293 Pogtovd Banka Award, supra note 86, 371.
294 See Alemanni Jurisdiction, supra note 290, 296; Ambiente Ufficio Jurisdiction, supra note 4, 472;
Abaclat Jurisdiction, supra note 78, 367.
295 Reisman & Vinnik, supra note 9, at 70.
296 Douglas, supra note 6, at 372 (emphasizing the importance that jurisdiction tests be "conducive to a
relatively high degree of legal certainty").
297 See Jeswald Salacuse, OfHandcuffs and Signals: Investment Treaties and Capital Flows to
Developing Countries, 58 HARV. INT'L L.J. 127, 130 (2017) ("A principal purpose of investment treaties
and the main reason that developing countries sign them is to promote investment. Thus, the title of
virtually all bilateral investment treaties states that it is a 'treaty for the promotion.. .of investment' or a
'treaty for the.. encouragement of investment."') (internal citations omitted).
298 Douglas, supra note 6, at 372.




and raising the overall costs of the process. 300 Finally, the uncertainty and
unpredictability undermine the legitimacy of the system, which is already subject
to criticism for producing inconsistent decisions that cannot be justified inter
se.
30 1
The commercial transaction test is even more problematic in the context
of non-ICSID arbitrations in which Article 25's jurisdictional requirements do
not apply, and particularly when the parties have manifestly agreed to arbitrate
the very disputes the test excludes. Applying the commercial transaction test in
such circumstances not only causes uncertainty but also undermines the ability
of States to effectively bind themselves through international agreements.
In sum, it is not just the disagreement over the meaning of "investment"
that is the cause of so much of the uncertainty and incoherence surrounding the
interpretation of that term. What commentators and tribunals agree on is also the
problem.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
It is clear that the commercial transaction test is fundamentally flawed-
historically, as a matter of interpretation, conceptually, and in practice. It does
not fulfill the intent of the Convention's drafters, is not textually supportable,
and does not apply a principled or predictable distinction between investment
and other commercial activities. It is, simply put, legally unsustainable.
But is there a policy case for maintaining the commercial transaction
test nonetheless? 302 Case law and commentary suggest four possible
justifications: (i) to promote the efficiency of the investment regime; (ii) to filter
out commercial disputes that could be adjudicated in other dispute resolution
centers; (iii) to limit conflict with international commercial law; and (iv) to limit
conflict with international trade law. In none of these roles, however, is the
commercial transaction test precise or effective. To the contrary, it is at best a
crude instrument for these purposes, all of which would be better pursued
through other means. When considered against the uncertainty costs that the test
31 See Gaillard, supra note 7, at 1.
301 See generally Franck, supra note 8 (discussing the inconsistency of the investor-State arbitration
regime).
302 As discussed above, commercial transaction is a vague term that is inherently intertwined with the
concept of investment. Assessing the impact of subjecting such transactions to ICSID arbitration poses a
challenge precisely because it is unclear what constitutes a commercial transaction as opposed to an
investment. At the same time, it is clear that because tribunals believe such a distinction exists,
eliminating the commercial transaction test would have some impact, though it is unclear with respect to
what exact transactions. For the sake of simplicity, I focus the below analysis on the sale of goods,
which appear to fall within most commentators' and tribunals' concept of "commercial transaction." I
use the terms "sale of goods" and commercial transaction interchangeably, without prejudice to whether
either constitutes an investment in any particular instance.
20201
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
generates, the weak policy case for the commercial transaction test supports the
legal conclusion that that it should be abandoned.
A. Economic Efficiency
The primary policy argument against a broad interpretation of Article
25 "investment" is that it would effectively expand ICSID's jurisdiction and
potentially lead to the filing of additional claims. States would thus either incur
additional litigation costs and potential adverse judgments or forgo
implementing beneficial regulations to avoid arbitration. 30 3 These costs, in terms
of both litigation costs and regulatory chill, would outweigh any benefit that
accrues from subjecting additional transactions to ICSID jurisdiction.
The exclusion of some transactions from ICSID arbitration could in fact
be justified on economic efficiency grounds. The principal economic function of
the international investment regime is to promote foreign investment by lowering
sovereign risk and its associated costs.3° 4 To achieve this function, international
investment law forces States to either "abstain from certain policy measures
[they] would otherwise take, and/or compensate investors for certain measures"
that they do take.305 In either scenario, States bear a cost by acceding to the
regime. From the perspective of the State, acceding to the regime only makes
sense if these costs are outweighed by the benefits of increased investment and
the associated positive externalities. Moreover, the regime is efficient as a whole
only if its transaction costs (e.g. litigation and other transaction costs) are lower
than the overall benefits (to States and investors) achieved by it.306
In this context, it could indeed make sense to focus the protection of the
regime on certain types of investments to the exclusion of other types. For
example, it may make sense to focus protection on FDI, which is understood to
yield more positive externalities to States in the way of employment, taxes, and
technology transfer. 3 0 7 Moreover, because of high sunk costs, FDI is not easily
dischargeable, is subject to relatively more sovereign risk, and is thus more likely
to benefit from investment protection. Conversely, it could make sense to
303 Sergio Puig, The Merging of International Trade and Investment Law, 33 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 1
(2015).
31 See Sykes, supra note 212, at 491.
305 Henrick Horn & Pehr-Johan Norback, A Non-Technical Introduction to Economic Aspects of
International Investment Agreements (Research Inst. Industrial Econ. IFN Working Paper No. 1250,
2018), https://www.ifi.se/wfiles/wp/wp1250.pdf (emphasis removed). See also Puig, supra note 303, at
46 (noting that investment treaty claims may "subject governments to constant pressure, particularly
given the destabilizing strain that accompanies parallel, sequential or combined legal actions. The need
to defend 'policy space' more frequently, often in strategically staged proceedings, may result in risk
aversion, rights accretion or regulatory chill.").
0 See Horn & Norback, supra note 305, at 14.
307 It is for these reasons, that in his dissenting opinion in Abaclat, Georges Abi-Saab called FDI the
'ideal type' of investment (in the Weberian sense of the term) for ICSID purposes." Abaclat Dissent on
Jurisdiction, supra note 58, 55. See also Salacuse, supra note 297, at 135 (noting that development
country governments consider FDI more valuable than other forms of capital because of the benefits it




exclude certain transactions, like sales of goods. Such transactions arguably offer
less in the way of positive externalities than FDI. Moreover, because of their low
sunk costs and short duration, they are subject to less sovereign risk and are less
likely to benefit from investment protection.308
If the goal is to promote the overall efficiency of the international
investment regime, however, the commercial transaction test is not a necessary
or appropriate tool for doing so. As an initial matter, there are several reasons to
believe that the commercial transaction test has a limited impact on the overall
number of investment arbitrations, and therefore that abandoning it would not
dramatically increase the overall investor-State caseload or its associated costs.
First, if it is true that sovereign risk with respect to so-called commercial
transactions is relatively low, then we would not expect to see a significant
number of claims arise from them. International investment arbitration addresses
and compensates for sovereign risk. If commercial transactions are subject to
less sovereign risk, relatively few acts of sovereign interference should occur,
and relatively few arbitrations should result.3°9
Second, recoverable damages arising from commercial transactions-
or at least the simple sales of goods-are likely to be relatively limited as
compared with other types of transactions. 310 Unlike with respect to direct
investments, the sunk costs of goods are low, 311 and the seller's expectation
damages are limited to losses stemming from the discrete goods or contract at
issue. Moreover, assuming an obligation to mitigate damages, the relative
mobility of goods and the availability of alternative markets mean that the
damages related to sales of goods should be further limited as compared to fixed
investment. When considered against the cost of ICSID arbitration, which can
reach millions of dollars, 312 these factors should further limit the number of
additional investment arbitrations resulting from abandoning the commercial
transaction test.
Third, most claimants already have the ability to avoid any Article 25
jurisdictional restrictions, including the commercial transaction test, by simply
choosing to arbitrate their investor-State claims pursuant to the UNCITRAL
Rules. 313 ICStD arbitration does offer some advantages over UNCITRAL
arbitration, particularly in terms of enforcement, but those advantages are
limited. The ICSID Convention requires that Contracting States enforce ICSID
308 See Sykes, supra note 212, at 519.
10 But see infra notes 324 & 325 & accompanying text discussing "umbrella clauses" and the exception
to this general proposition.
310 Sykes, supra note 212, at 519.
311 Id.
312 SCHREUER II, supra note 17, art. 59.
113 See Reisman & Vinnik, supra note 9, at,70. As noted above, UNCITRAL tribunals have imported
ICSID jurisprudence on the question of Article 25 "investment" even where they are not subject to the
restrictions of that Article, but those instances appear limited. See, e.g., Alps Finance Award, supra note
22, 245; Romak Award, supra note 121.
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awards as "as if [they] were a final judgment of a court in that State." 314 Non-
ICSID awards, on the other hand, are subject to enforcement pursuant to the New
York Convention, which sets forth certain grounds for resisting enforcement of
an award. But those grounds are "narrow," and the burden of proof they require
is "heavy., 315 Indeed, with respect to the relatively small number of arbitral
awards that are not complied with voluntarily, the "overwhelming majority" are
recognized and enforced.316 The commercial transaction test may therefore be
simply "pric[ing] [ICSID] out of the market"317 in favor of arbitration under the
UNCITRAL Rules without significantly reducing the overall number of
investment arbitrations. Thus, while jettisoning the test might shift investment
claims back to ICSID from UNCITRAL, it should have a more limited impact
on the overall number of investment arbitrations.
Moreover, there are several reasons to believe that States are better
positioned than tribunals to weigh the costs and benefits of subjecting specific
transactions to investment protection and to implement the exclusion of
transactions whose protection they determine to be inefficient.
Whether the costs of subjecting certain transactions to ICSIiD
jurisdiction outweigh the benefits is a complex question. Scholars continue to
debate the question of whether and how investment treaties stimulate foreign
investment and capital flows, 318 and the literature on how economic interests
314 ICSID Convention, supra note 10, art. 54(1).
313 See Int'l Trading & Indus. Inv. Co. v. Dyncorp Aerospace Tech., 763 F. Supp. 2d 12, 20 (D.D.C.
2011) ("[Because] the New York Convention provides only several narrow circumstances when a court
may deny confirmation of an arbitral award, confirmation proceedings are generally summary in
nature."); Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, 949 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 (D.D.C. 2013) ("The party
resisting confirmation bears the heavy burden of establishing that one of the grounds for denying
confirmation in Article V applies."); see also BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND
PRACTICE, supra note 29, at 378 ("mhe [New York] Convention establishes a 'pro-enforcement'
approach toward foreign awards."); id. at 377 ("[T]he New York Convention provides for an award's
presumptive recognition, subject to only narrow, enumerated exceptions. Likewise, most arbitration
statutes, including the UNCITRAL Model Law, presumptively require the recognition of awards, again
subject only to specifically-identified exceptions.").
316 BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 29, at 377.
317 See Reisman & Vinnik, supra note 9, at 70.
318 Various studies have reached different conclusions on the matter, though "on balance... one may
say that the more recent of these studies tend to show a positive correlation" between BITs and foreign
investment flows. Salucuse, supra note 297, at 132. See, e.g., Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral
Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct Investment?: Only a Bit... and They Could Bite, in THE
EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 349 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds.,
2009) (finding no causation between BITs and foreign investment); Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do
Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD
DEV. 1567 (2005) (finding strong correlation between BITs and FDI); Salucuse, supra note 297, at 132
(finding a positive correlation between total capital flows and BITs); Jeswold Salacuse & Nicholas P.
Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation ofBilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand
Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 67 (2005) (finding a positive correlation between the existence of BITs
between the U.S. and developing countries and the capital flows to developing countries, but finding
less evidence as to correlation with respect to BITs concluded with other OECD countries); Jason Webb
Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International) Law: Do
BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment, 42 LAW & SoC'y REV. 805, 807 (2008) (finding no
correlation).
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implicate treaty design is still in its "nascent" stages.319 Evaluating whether the
coverage of specific transactions is efficient requires weighing both the
opportunity costs of foregone regulation 320 against the benefits of such coverage.
With respect to sales of goods in particular, the benefits would include not just
increased incidence of those transactions and the value they generate, but their
support of FDI, 32' which is highly dependent upon other flows of goods and
capital.322
States are in a better position to conduct this cost-benefit analysis than
tribunals, particularly because the calculus may depend on each jurisdiction's
relative level of economic development, place in the international economy, and
the strength of their domestic legal system. Their preferences, moreover, may
change over time, as these factors evolve. 323
States' preferences may also depend upon other treaty obligations they
have assumed, and in particular, whether the BIT at issue has a so-called
umbrella clause. While "relatively uncommon"' 32 4 and controversial, at least
some tribunals have found such clauses to convert contractual rights into
actionable treaty rights. 325 Where such a clause applies and is interpreted to
convert breaches of contract into breaches of the treaty, the cost of consenting to
the arbitration of so-called commercial transactions would likely be higher, as
more contracts would be covered by the umbrella clause, and therefore more
commercial disputes would be converted into treaty claims. On the other hand,
where no such clause applies or it is not given such effect, the cost would likely
be lower, because only pure treaty claims arising from such contracts would be
subject to ICSID.
319 Horn and Norback, supra note 305, at 4. See also Sykes, supra note 212, at 482.
320 Puig, supra note 303.
321 See Salacuse, supra note 297, at 134; CARMEN REINHART & KENNETH ROGoFF, THIS TIME IS
DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 31 (2009) ("In practice, the three types of capital
flows [debt, equity, and FDI] are often interlinked (e.g., foreign firms will often bring cash into a
country in advance of actually making plant acquisitions).").
322 FDI and the sale of goods are so inter-dependent that half of all international trade in goods is
between affiliates of multinational corporations. See European Commission, COM(2010)343 Final, 7
July, 2010, Communication from the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament, The
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, "Towards a
Comprehensive European International Investment Policy", at 3.
323 For example, prior to the 1980s, many governments preferred indirect investment as opposed to
direct investment so as to maintain domestic ownership of industries. Reinbart & Rogoff, supra note
321, at 31, n. 13.
324 See Julian Arato, The Logic of Contract in the World of Investment Treaties, 58 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 351, 372 (2016).
32 For background on and a taste of the debate over umbrella clauses, see Stanmir A. Alexandrov,
Breaches of Contract and Breaches of Treaty, 5 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 555 (2004); John P. Gaffney
& James L. Loffis, The "'Effective Ordinary Meaning" of BITs and the Jurisdiction of Treaty-Based
Tribunals to Hear Contract Claims, 8 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 5 (2007); Christoph Schreuer, Travelling
the BIT Route: Of Waiting Period, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, 5 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE
231, 249-55 (2004); Stephan Schill, Enabling Private Ordering: Function, Scope and Effect of
Umbrella Clauses in International Investment Treaties, 18 MINN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2009); Jarrod Wong,
Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of Contract, Treaty Violations, and the
Divide Between Developing and Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON
L. REv. 135 (2006).
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States are also better positioned to implement the exclusion of certain
transactions, though the negotiation of such exclusions would no doubt involve
its own costs. As discussed above, pursuant to the "double-barrel" test, States
may narrow the definition of Article 25 "investment"3 26 by way of the definitions
of "investment" in their respective consent documents. Those definitions are
almost always more robust and granular than the undefined term in the ICSID
Convention. States may therefore use these definitions to carefully excise
specific transactions in a way that avoids the uncertainty of the commercial
transaction test.
B. The Exclusion of Commercial Disputes
The exclusion of commercial transactions from ICSID jurisdiction has
also been justified as means to exclude commercial disputes from the Centre.
According to the Comments to the Additional Facility Rules, the purpose of the
commercial transaction exclusion in that forum was to emphasize that the
Additional Facility is not an "alternative to existing mechanisms for the
settlement of commercial disputes." 327 The tribunal in Joy Mining-the first to
reject jurisdiction on the basis of the commercial transaction test-appears to
have employed similar reasoning. In rejecting jurisdiction over a so-called
commercial transaction, it asked rhetorically:
[I]f a distinction is not drawn between ordinary sales contracts,
even if complex, and an investment... what difference would
there be with the many State contracts that are submitted every
day to international arbitration in connection with contractual
performance, at such bodies as the International Chamber of
Commerce and the London Court of International
Arbitration?328
This reasoning fails to provide a basis for the exclusion of commercial
transactions for the same reason that a proposal in the travaux to exclude
commercial disputes fails to provide such a basis: 3 2 9 it conflates the type of
economic activity with the type of cause of action it gives rise to.
The "commercial" nature of international commercial arbitration refers
to the type of relationship between the disputing parties, not the type of claims
which either party may bring, which may include contractual, statutory or other
claims. 330 With limited exceptions, international investment arbitration is not
326 See supra notes 65-67 & accompanying text.
327 Comment to Additional Facility Rules, supra note 207, art. 4, cmt. i.
328 Joy Mining Jurisdiction, supra note 103, 58.
329 See supra notes 202-204 & accompanying text.
30 Cf BORN ICA Vol. 1, supra note 244, at 304 ("The commercial relationship requirement [of the New
York Convention] focuses only on the nature of the underlying relationship between the parties, and not
on whether the parties are asserting contract claims, statutory claims, or other types of claims .... ").
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concerned with disputes arising in a commercial relationship; it addresses
disputes that arise between a State and private actor in a sovereign-subject
relationship. 331 Each mechanism thus deals with a distinct type of risk arising
from a distinct type of relationship: international commercial arbitration
addresses commercial risk that arises between two parties in a commercial
relationship; international investment arbitration addresses sovereign risk that
arises in a sovereign-subject relationship. 3 32 As numerous tribunals have pointed
out, commercial and sovereign risk are distinct, such that the same activity can
be subject to both risks, one or the other, or neither. 333 Sovereign risk may arise
in the context of a purely commercial relationship, where the State interferes
with a private party's ability to perform its contractual obligations. Commercial
risk, on the other hand, may arise in a contractual relationship between a private
party and a State, where the State defaults on its contractual obligations.334
Because the commercial transaction test relies on a type of transaction
as a proxy for a type dispute, it is both over- and under-exclusive as a tool for
filtering out commercial disputes. It is over-exclusive because it excludes
sovereign-subject disputes arising from transactions that are "commercial" in
nature. It is under-exclusive because it does not exclude commercial disputes
where the underlying transaction is an investment.335 If the intent is to exclude
commercial disputes from ICSID arbitration, the better way is for tribunals to
331 See Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 45 (2007)
("[Investment treaty arbitration] is predominantly used to resolve disputes arising from the exercise of
public authority. Put differently, the subject-matter of investment treaty arbitration is a class of disputes
arising from the state's relationships with individuals who are subject to the exercise of public authority
by the state. This is very different from the consensual arbitration of conventional international disputes
(between states) or commercial disputes (between private parties) in which both disputing parties are
equally capable of possessing legal rights and obligations."). See also Douglas, supra note 6, at 363, 383
("[T]he raison d'etre of an investment treaty is precisely to reduce the sovereign risk associated with a
[S]tate's enforcement jurisdiction."). While some BITs contain umbrella clauses which consent to
investor-State arbitration of contractual disputes between State entities and foreign investors, such
clauses are the exception to the general rationale of the investor-State regime, which is to protect against
sovereign risk. See also Arato, supra note 324 (discussing the ways that international investment law
governs contracts with States).
332 See Douglas, supra note 6, at 386 ("[I]nvestment treaties.., are not concerned with commercial
risk.").
... See, e.g., Compafiia de Aguas del Aconquija SA & Vivendi Universal (formerly Compagnie
Grnrrale des Eaux) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, 60,
(July 3, 2002) ("[A] particular investment dispute may at the same time involve issues of the
interpretation and application of the BIT's standards and questions of contract."); id. ("[W]hether there
has been a breach of the BIT and whether there has been a breach of contract are different questions.
Each of these claims will be determined by reference to its own proper or applicable law-in the case of
the BIT, by international law, in the case of the Concession Contract, by the proper law of the
contract."); Jan de Nul Jurisdiction, supra note 83, 80 ("Accordingly, the fact that a dispute involves
contract rights and contract remedies does not in and of itself mean that it cannot also involve treaty
breaches and treaty claims.").
... See, e.g., Belize Bank Ltd. v. Gov't of Belize, 852 F.3d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (affirming district
court award enforcing an international arbitration award against Belize issued by the London Court of
International Arbitration for breach of contract).
... The commercial transaction test would exclude some commercial disputes that would otherwise be
admitted pursuant to umbrella clauses, namely, commercial disputes that arise from a commercial
transaction with the host State.
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directly examine the nature of the dispute and determine whether it arises from
a commercial relationship or a State exercising its sovereign powers.
C. Avoiding Conflict with International Commercial Law
Relatedly, at least one tribunal has justified the exclusion of
"commercial transactions" from ICSID jurisdiction as necessary to avoid
conflict with international commercial law. The tribunal in Joy Mining stated:
International contracts are today a central feature of
international trade and have stimulated far reaching
developments in the governing law, among them the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, and significant conceptual contributions. Yet, those
contracts are not investment contracts, except in exceptional
circumstances, and are to be kept separate and distinct for the
sake of a stable legal order.3 36
If the goal, however, is to prevent conflict with commercial law, the
commercial transaction test is the wrong tool for doing so. The potential for
conflict between negotiated contract terms and investment law protections exists
independent of whether so-called commercial transactions are subject to
investor-State arbitration. That is because international investment law applies
to at least some "non-commercial" contracts (i.e., so-called "investment
contracts") between States and foreign nationals.337 Indeed, investment treaties
are understood to have generated a "rudimentary, yet broad, law of contracts"
338
that has the potential to intersect and conflict with private international law and
party choice.339 For example, a conflict may arise where a contract designates a
commercial arbitration center or national court as the exclusive forum for dispute
resolution, but the governing treaty contains an umbrella clause that elevates
contractual breaches to breaches of treaty and allows recourse to ICSID. 340 A
similar conflict may arise with respect to the calculation of damages, where a
contract specifies liquidated damages in the case of breach, but international
investment law provides a standard of fair market value. 34 1
336 Joy Mining Jurisdiction, supra note 103, 58.
"' Arato, supra note 324, at 352.
338Id.
"I Arato identifies at least three areas where international investment law may intersect and conflict
with contracts: forum selection clauses, fair and equitable treatment, and damages. See id.
340 Investment tribunals have diverged on how to handle such cases. Compare SGS Socidtd Gdndrale de
Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case. No. ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal
on Objections to Jurisdiction, 128 (Jan. 29, 2004) (giving precedent to the contract's exclusive forum
selection clause) with SGS v. Paraguay Jurisdiction, supra note 267, In 131, 138-142 (privileging the
treaty clause providing a right to ICSID arbitration).
341 Tribunals have diverged on this question as well. Compare Sempra Energy International v. The
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, 304 (Sept. 28, 2007) (applying intemational
law principles on damages in the context of a contractual arrangement); Enron Corporation and
Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, 268 (May 22,
[Vol. 45: 1
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Excluding so-called commercial contracts may isolate some contractual
arrangements from the contract law that investment treaties create.3 4 2 But it does
not actually keep international private law "separate" from investment treaty
law,343 which will apply to other privately negotiated contracts regardless. Nor
does it contribute to "a stable legal order." In fact, it does nothing to solve the
underlying tension between the protections provided by investment treaties and
the agreements of private parties. A more complete way of addressing that
tension would be to exclude commercial (e.g., contractual) disputes (not
transactions) from ICSID arbitration. Short of that, resolving this tension will
require a more nuanced and thoughtful consideration for how the two systems
interact and inter-relate. 344
D. Avoiding Conflict with International Trade Law
Finally, the commercial transaction test is arguably justifiable as a
means of avoiding conflict with international trade law. The potential for conflict
with trade law is particularly salient because both trade and investment law
address the same types of acts (sovereign) and provide the same or similar
guarantees, including national treatment and most-favored nation treatment. 345
If they covered the same subject matter (for example, the cross-border trade of
goods), inefficient and inconsistent parallel proceedings could result.3 46
In addition to causing inefficiencies and inconsistencies, such parallel
proceedings could also erode the different approaches to dispute resolution and
remedies taken by the two regimes. Investor-State arbitration provides standing
to aggrieved private actors to bring claims directly against the State and offers
both monetary and sometimes injunctive relief to damaged parties. The WTO
dispute settlement procedure, on the other hand, grants no standing to private
parties and does not allow damages to private parties harmed by impermissible
trade restrictive measures. 347 Instead, complaints of violations may be submitted
by State members only, and the relief made available is restricted to "voluntarily
2007) (same); and CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award, 281 (May 12, 2005) (same) with Kardassopoulos v. Republic of Georgia, ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/18, Award, 480-481 (Mar. 3, 2010) (finding a presumption that international law
principles apply absent an express statement in the contract to the contrary).
32 Arato, supra note 324, at 352.
311 Joy Mining Jurisdiction, supra note 103, 58.
'" For thoughtful analysis on this question, see generally Arato, supra note 324, and Julian Arato, The
Private Law Critique of International Investment Law, 113 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2019).
311 See Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties:
Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 48 (2008).
346 See Puig, supra note 303, at 16-17.
"4 The WTO Agreements, including specifically the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), require Contracting States to establish
domestic procedures for the challenge of certain State measures. See General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.1994 art. X.3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 [hereinafter GATT 1994]; and Agreement on
Government Procurement art. XVIII, Apr. 12, 1979, 1235 U.N.T.S. 258. Most adjudication of trade
disputes happens before such tribunals rather than the WTO. See PETROS MAvROIDIs, THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, VOL. 2, 65, 688-691 (2016).
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agreed compensatory market access" by the violating State, or, failing that, "the
prospective suspension of [trade] concessions" by the aggrieved State.348 The
substantive overlap in trade and investment regimes allows aggrieved private
actors to bridge this divide and privatize what would otherwise be considered a
public inter-State trade dispute by bringing the action before an investor-State
tribunal.34 9
But if the potential for conflict between international investment and
international trade law is a concern, the commercial transaction test is an
inadequate tool for addressing it. The international trade and investment regimes
have already been moving toward convergence (and thus potential conflict), and
will likely continue to do so regardless of the definition of "investment" adopted
by ICSID tribunals.3 5 ° This convergence is evident in the legal architecture of
the regimes351 and in the emergence of parallel trade and investment proceedings
that have already been brought with respect to lumber,352 tobacco, and soft-drink
regulations. 35
3
Indeed, these parallel proceedings demonstrate that cross-border sales
of goods may be subject to investment arbitration regardless of whether the
commercial transaction test is applied or not. The Mexican soft-drink related
dispute is illustrative. In the early 2000's, Mexico imposed certain import
requirements and a 20% excise tax on soft drinks containing a sweetener other
than sugar, including high-fructose corn syrup ("I-IFCS"). 3 5 4 This measure was
successfully challenged by the United States through the WTO dispute
settlement body, 355 resulting in a settlement framework on market access, which
34 Gaetan Verhoosel, The Use of Investor-State Arbitration under Bilateral Investment Treaties -to Seek
Relieffor Breaches of WTO Law, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 493, 494 (2003).
349 ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 18 (2009). See also Van
Harten, supra note 331, at 97 ("the claimant is no longer a publicly representative entity but a private
party with full custody of the claim, who can decide the manner and extent to which international
adjudication will be used to resolve a regulatory dispute").
350 See Puig, supra note 303, at 12 ("The legal frameworks have adapted-albeit slowly--to the
Iconvergence' between trade and investment and the needs of supply-chain trade.").
351 For example, multiple multilateral free trade agreements contain within them investment chapters
providing similar guarantees to international investment as stand-alone bilateral investment treaties. See
Mark Wu, Property, Investment and the Scope of Investment Protection Obligations, in THE
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO PRACTICE 169,177
(Zachary Douglas et al. eds., 2014); see generally DiMascio and Pauwelyn, supra note 345 (discussing
the similarities and differences in the application of National Treatment in the trade and investment
regimes). Moreover, the WTO framework has also moved expressly into the governance of investment-
related matters by way of three different agreements concluded during the Uruguay Round, including
the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS), and the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
352 See L. Guglya, The Interplay of International Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: The Softwood Lumber
Controversy, 2 J. INT'L DISP. SETTLEMENT 175 (2011).
... See Wu, supra note 351, at 170-171, nn. 9 & 10.
... This tax was preceded by the imposition of anti-dumping duties on high fructose corn syrup (IFSC)
imported from the U.S. Those measures were successfully challenged by the United States in the WTO
and thereafter withdrawn by Mexico. See Panel Report, Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation on High
Fructose Corn Syrup from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS132/ (adopted Feb. 24, 2000).
... Appellate Body Report, Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WTO Doe.
VT/DS308/AB/R (adopted Mar. 24, 2006).
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included Mexico's withdrawal of the 20% tax.356 At the same time, four U.S.
companies initiated three separate investor-State arbitrations against Mexico for
the import requirements and excise tax, arguing that the tax violated Mexico's
national treatment obligations under NAFTA's Chapter 11. 357 In particular, the
claimant in Cargill v. Mexico asserted that Mexico's 20% tax on soft drinks
containing -FCS discriminated against its investment in Mexico, whose
business was to import HFCS from its parent company in the U.S. and then sell
the product to Mexican bottling companies.358
Mexico did not dispute that Cargill's Mexican subsidiary, which was
headquartered in Mexico and employed over 1,000 people, amounted to an
investment. 359 Mexico did, however, argue that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction
over claims for any loses related to Cargill's activities as a producer and exporter
of HFCS. In other words, Mexico argued for separating Cargill's foreign direct
investment from the goods that it imported, and for limiting the tribunal's
jurisdiction to the former. The tribunal rejected that argument, however, and
found that Cargill's investment included its "sale into and distribution of HFCS
within the Mexican market," and that the excise tax prevented the claimant from
operating that investment. 360 The tribunal further noted that "there is no express
or implied presumption that measures dealing with goods cannot ipso facto be
alleged to be measures 'relating to' investors or investments. 36 1 It held that the
import business of the Mexican affiliate and the production and export business
of the U.S. parent company were just two "side[s] of the [same] coin., 3 62 It
accordingly awarded the claimant $77.3 million in damages, 36 3 which included
losses suffered by both the U.S. export company and the Mexican import
company. 364
While controversial,365 the decision in Cargill demonstrates that where
an exporter of goods maintains a purchasing entity in the importing State, that
356 See Letter from Ambassador Richard T. Crowder to Undersecretary Angel Villalobos, U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE (July 27, 2006),
www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade Agreements/Regional/NAFTA/assetupload file694 10810.pdf.
117 See Cargill Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case. No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award (Sept. 18, 2009)
[hereinafter Cargill Award]; Archer Daniels Midland Co. and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v.
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/05, Award (Nov. 21, 2007) [hereinafter ADM
Award]; Corn Products International, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/1,
Award (Aug. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Corn Products Award].
358 While Mexico argued that the tax was a valid trade counter-measure instituted in response to U.S.
dumping of HFCS in the Mexican market, all three tribunals, including the tribunal in Cargill, rejected
that argument and found for the claimants and awarded damages. Cargill Award, supra note 357, 559
(awarding $77.3 million); Corn Products Award, supra note 357 (awarding $58.4 million); ADM
Award, supra note 357, 304(4) (awarding $33.5 million).





363 1 d. 559.
3 4 Id. 519-26.
36 For critical takes on the decision, see Roger P. Alford, The Convergence of International Trade and
Investment Arbitration, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 35, 48 (2013), which argues that the Cargill award
is disconnected from the policy goal of promoting and protecting FDI; Matthew Kronby, Cargill v.
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entity may challenge measures that regulate the goods that it imports. A broader
definition of "investment" that includes imported goods as investments in and of
themselves would of course increase the opportunity for challenging such
regulations. Davies argues that if the facts of Cargill were changed such that
Cargill did not have a local Mexican subsidiary, "the effect would most likely be
to remove the existence of any investment" 366 and thus divest the tribunal of
jurisdiction. Yet, in a world where half of all trade consists of intermediate goods
and services traded among affiliates of the multinational companies, 367 imported
goods are likely to be subject to investor-State arbitration regardless of whether
Article 25 excludes such goods as investments in their own right.
In this context, the potential for conflict with international trade law
requires thoughtful consideration of how the two regimes may and should
interrelate. Specifically, the fundamental characteristics of the international
investment regime and the fundamental nature of goods generally suggest how
the effects of extending jurisdiction to imports even absent a local enterprise may
be limited.368 First, investor-State arbitration requires a territorial link between
the investment and the host State respondent.369 Imported goods would develop
a territorial nexus sufficient to subject to them jurisdiction only once they had
entered into the host State (and passed any tariff barrier) or if the contract for the
exported goods was subject to the local law of the host State. 370 Second, even
with respect to goods that meet the territorial requirement, damages are likely to
be relatively limited, as discussed above. 371 Third, unlike the WTO's
enforcement mechanism, investor-State arbitration is fundamentally backward-
looking. 372 Whereas adverse WTO decisions provide market access
Mexico: The Territorial Scope of Damages Under the NAFTA, 8 GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 359,
360 (2013), which argues that the tribunal's reasoning was "not entirely persuasive" and Puig, supra
note 303, at 27, which argues that Cargill sets a "very bad precedent" because "it allows investors to
convert losses suffered by production facilities in one NAFTA country into losses suffered in another,
and goes~beyond the jurisdictional authority of investor-State tribunals on investment into trade."
3' Arwel Davies, Scoping the Boundary Between the Trade Law and Investment Law Regimes: When
Does a Measure Relate to Investment?, 15 J. INT'L ECON. L. 793, 822 (2012).
367 See Communication from the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament, The European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, "Towards a Comprehensive
European International Investment Policy", at 3, COM (2010) 343 final (July 7, 2010).
" As discussed above, the limited duration of commercial contracts, including imports, should translate
into less risk of sovereign interference. See supra Section V.A.
369 See Douglas, supra note 6, at 382-83 (definitions of "investments" that include "claims to money" or
"claim to performance" "must be read in their proper context, which is to define the rights and interests
that qualify as assets that might qualify as investments in the host state.... [t]his territorial link [to the
host state] is necessary because a state's jurisdiction in international law to enforce its laws and
regulations is territorial and the raison d'etre of an investment treaty is precisely to reduce the sovereign
risk associated with a state's enforcement jurisdiction.").
370 See LAWRENCE COLLINS, DICEY, MORRIS AND COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1117 (14th ed.
2006) (noting that the situs of a chose-in-action is the country in which it is properly recoverable or can
be enforced). Claims for tariffs imposed at the border should not be actionable. This is consistent with
the application of National Treatment in the GATT 1994, supra note 347. See DiMascio & Pauwelyn,
supra note 345, at 47-48.
371 See accompanying text of supra notes 310-311; see also Sykes, supra note 212, at 519.
372 See Wu, supra note 351, at 174-75 ("the international trade regime seeks to promote trade
liberalization through 'reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed toward the
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade.' The international investment regime, on the other hand,
[Vol. 45: 1
Investment Misconceived
prospectively, investor-State enforcement aims to compensate for harmful
actions that occurred in the past. 3
Together, these principles suggest that actions related to imported goods
should be admissible but limited to circumstances in which the imports suffered
some adverse action in the territory of the host State. The admission of imports
to ICSID jurisdiction should not be used as an opportunity to challenge
prospective harm that could be incurred if the import were to pass the border as
a result of a policy already in place. Again, the Cargill arbitration is illustrative.
In that case, Cargill was awarded future lost profits on products that it had
expected to import but did not in light of the Mexican government's 20% excise
tax on non-sugar sweeteners. The tribunal awarded damages on these
hypothetical imports because the basis of jurisdiction was Cargill's business
subsidiary in Mexico. According to the tribunal, it made sense to award lost
profits on Cargill's import operation generally (as opposed to actually realized
imports) because the investment here was defined as the enterprise. If,
counterfactually, Cargill had not maintained a physical operation in Mexico but
its claims were nevertheless admitted on the grounds that its imports of HFCS
were protected investments, the principles outlined above suggest that its
damages should have been limited to any actual losses suffered on imports
already in the country, when the Mexican measures were passed. Moreover, any
damages awarded should have been reduced to the extent the imported HFCS
could have been sold elsewhere.
VI. CONCLUSION
Amid "[t]he intensive debate, not to say controversy, regarding the term
'investment,' ' 374 tribunals and commentators have agreed on at least one thing:
"ordinary commercial transactions" 375 like "simple sales and purchases of goods
... clearly do not qualify as investments." 376 As this Article has shown, this
consensus has been highly influential. In terms of the number of negative
jurisdictional awards it has justified, the investment-commerce distinction has
seeks to promote greater cross-border investment, through recognizing that 'reciprocal protection under
international agreement of such investments will be conducive to [its] stimulation."' (quoting GATT
1994 preamble and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 2005 Model Bilateral
Investment Treaty, preamble, respectively)). See also DiMascio & Pauwelyn, supra note 345, at 88
("International trade agreements... [seek] to liberalize market access for foreign goods and services in
order to boost overall welfare through a more efficient allocation of the world's resources. International
investment agreements, primarily BITs, provide stable legal standards and an autonomous enforcement
system to reduce the risk premium for individual investors, thereby promoting greater flows of capital
across borders and the economic development of host countries.").
... See, e.g., DiMascio & Pauwelyn, supra note 345, at 81 ("the overall history of investment treaties
demonstrates that the national treatment provisions were inserted into most BITs to protect individual
foreign investors from targeted attacks by their host governments."). While investor-State arbitration
provides for expectation damages, including for future lost profits, such damages are still the result of a
harm realized in the past.
... Ambiente Ufficio Jurisdiction, supra note 4, 442.
375 SCHREUER II, supra note 17 art. 25, 122.
376 SCHREUERI, supra note 13, art. 25, 120.
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had an impact equal to or greater than the other dominant definition of
"investment," the Salini test.
Yet the investment-commerce distinction is fundamentally flawed-as
a matter of history, interpretation, concept, and practice. Contrary to statements
in the literature and case law, there was no fundamental assumption on the part
of the Convention's drafters that commercial transactions would be excluded
from ICSID. Nor does the Convention's text require that result: at least some so-
called commercial transactions fit comfortably within reasonable textual
interpretations of the term "investment." Conceptually, investment and
commercial transactions are inherently intertwined: investment is in fact a type
of commercial activity, and even the sale of goods may constitute an investment
pursuant to economic principles. Finally, the commercial transaction test used to
apply the distinction in practice provides no principled, predictable or textually
supportable basis for distinguishing between investment and non-investment
transactions. Nor does it effectively implement any policy goal; it merely sows
confusion and uncertainty.
If the one thing that tribunals and commentators have been able to agree
on with respect to the definition of "investment" is misconceived and is at the
root of the uncertainty surrounding that term, where does that leave the
"investment" debate?
It should not, I would argue, lead it back to the subjective approach to
the definition of "investment." The term "investment" can and should have a
fixed boundary even without the investment-commerce distinction. The positive
definitions of "investment" -the "ordinary meaning" and the Salini test
definitions-offer two such potential boundaries.
To those who maintain that those positive definitions do not provide a
sufficiently hard boundary for the term and leave it vulnerable to "infmitively
elastic" interpretations, 377 1 suggest consideration of another negative definition:
one that defines "investment" not vis-A-vis commercial transactions, but instead
vis-A-vis consumption transactions.
As discussed above, the fundamental distinction drawn in economics is
not between investment and commerce, but between investment and
consumption. While consumption transactions include outlays for personal end-
use, investments are purchases for future use that "will produce value in the
future. ' 3 7 8 This distinction, of course, recalls one of the main factors used in the
commercial transaction test: the creation of value. 379 As I argued above, the
problem with that factor is not that it is inconsistent with the definition of
"investment," but rather that it is misapplied to exclude transactions that actually
do create value and that do constitute investments. A true application of the
377 Waibel, supra note 11, at 722.
378 Moselle, supra note 1, at 12 (emphasis removed).




"value creation" factor is fully consistent with the investment-consumption
distinction.
The focus on future value creation is also consistent with the "ordinary
meaning" definition of "investment," which requires a present outlay (i.e.
"commitment of money or other assets") in order to create value in the future
(i.e., "for the purpose of providing a return").380 It can help inform the outer
boundary of that definition by clarifying that not "any kind of asset or economic
transaction" 381 qualifies as an investment, and that, in particular, end-use
consumer transactions do not qualify.
In principle, all of the activities found to be commercial transactions in
the cases described in Part II would constitute investments under this approach.
The engineering, delivery and maintenance of a longwall mining system (Joy
Mining), efforts to recover shipwreck cargo (Malaysian Historical Salvors), the
delivery and sale of wheat (Romak) and poultry (Global Trading), the purchase
of receivables (Alps Finance), the purchase of coal for commercial power
generation (Nova Scotia Power), government bonds (Postova), and the purchase
of hot briquetted iron (Tenaris)-none of these were for the personal end-use of
the claimants. They were rather were aimed at some future use or return.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that each of the associated
claims would be covered by ICSID's jurisdiction. A definition of "investment"
based on the investment-consumption distinction would require that an actual
outlay or purchase was made, not just intended or promised-a factor that could
exclude some contracts. Moreover, jurisdiction would require that the
investment was in the territory of the Respondent State-a factor that, as
discussed above, could exclude the cross-border sale of goods (like the wheat
and poultry at issue in Romak and Global Trading), regardless of whether those
goods were found to constitute investments. And of course, they would be
subject to all of ICSID's other jurisdictional requirements, including "consent in
writing."
Replacing the investment-commerce distinction with an investment-
consumption distinction would not solve all of the disagreements in the
investment debate. Certainly, creative lawyers would find ways to argue over
this definition as well. But it has sufficient qualities, at least facially, to warrant
further exploration. In contrast to the subjective approach, it provides an
objective and independent meaning to the term "investment," respecting the text
of the Convention and the principles of treaty interpretation required by the
VCLT. In contrast to the Salini test, the investment-consumption distinction is
at least in theory predictable and cannot be stretched or shnmk by tribunals at
their whim. And finally, in contrast to the investment-commerce distinction, it
... Malaysian Historical Salvors Annulment, supra note 16, 57.
3 Romak Award, supra note 121 205. See also Mortenson, supra note 22, at 260 (suggesting
investment be defined as "any plausibly economic activity or asset").
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defines investment's outer boundary based on basic economic principles, rather
than vague intuitions.
Regardless of whether this or another definition of "investment" is
adopted, the current distinction drawn by ICSID tribunals between commercial
and investment transactions should be abandoned.
